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SYNOPSIS
Prom a review of inner city policy, Michael Heseltine 
proposed in September 1979 the establishment of urban development 
corporations (UDCfs), based on the new town development 
corporation model, to regenerate the areas of greatest dereliction. 
London Docklands and the ’’Merseyside Dock Area” were to get UDC’s 
and the proposal was later extended to include the East End of 
Glasgow. The initiative was, however, greeted with substantial 
opposition, particularly in London, and the Glasgow proposal was 
withdrawn after initial reaction from the local authorities. 
Nevertheless, the Government has maintained the UDC proposals for 
Liverpool and London Docklands despite the countervailing 
arguments that UDCfs will not help regenerate their areas. The aim 
of this dissertation is to discover why the Government has 
steadfastly supported the UDC proposalsj to determine the logic of 
UDC's.
Identification of an approach to understanding UDC’s is 
sought through a review of central state intervention in inner 
cities. The inner city policy experience appears somewhat perverse* 
a catalogue of initiatives which, to the surprise of few, have not 
lived up to their promises. To explain the course of inner city 
policy, and to understand UDCfs, an understanding of the role of the 
central state is required and the two principal positions on this 
are stated. One sees the state as essentially neutral whereas the 
other sees the state as playing a positive role which is biased 
toward certain groups in society. Accordingly, the two 
interpretations of the role of the state prescribe different 
approaches toward gaining an understanding of UDC!s. The first 
suggests an explanation can be found in the nature of the problems 
in the inner areas while the second suggests an examination of the 
problems of central state intervention would be more fruitful.
Paced with two alternative approaches, the former and 
orthodox approach is adopted to see if it can provide an adequate 
explanation of UDC’s. The strategies and problems of urban
regeneration in the three areas subject to a UDC proposal are 
examined in detail; an inner city partnership in Liverpool, an 
inner city partnership plus statutory joint committee in London 
Docklands, and the Glasgow East Area Renewal (GEAR) project.
Despite many differences between the cases, common elements are 
identified and set out in terms of the requirements of urban 
regeneration. The nature of UDC's is then established and an 
assessment made of their likelihood of meeting these requirements 
better than the arrangements they would replace. It is suggested 
that UDC’s would have only limited advantages, several 
disadvantages, and, further, that there>existed superior 
alternatives available. GEAR, having been retained in preference 
to a UDC is looked at closely in this respect.
The search for the logic of UDC’s is then led to an 
examination of the course of the proposal since its inception to 
see how it was justified by the Government in the face of 
opposition. It transpires that, rather than justify the UDC 
initiative, the Government made every effort to defend the 
proposal by preventing its consideration. This exploratory search 
provides no satisfactory rationale for UDC’s; it can only suggest 
that UDC’s are a mis-informed policy, albeit one which was 
defended with great commitment.
Turning to the second perspective on state intervention, the 
coincidence is noted between the requirements of state intervention 
which it suggests and the requirements for urban regeneration which 
were identified from the three case studies. Although this approach 
was not pursued, it appears to offer a greater prospect of 
uncovering the logic of UDC's , based on the exercising of the 
priorities of state intervention during economic recession. The way 
in which this perspective can explain the, otherwise seemingly 
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The crisis, said Antonio Gramsci, 
consists precisely in that the 
old is dead and the new cannot 
be born; in the meantime a variety 
of morbid symptoms will occur.
CHAPTER 1
A NEW URBAN INITIATIVE FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
The Question of Urban Development Corporations
Nowhere are the manifestations of the general decline and 
shifts in British industry more starkly evident than in the old 
urban areas where the declining activities were concentrated. 
Extensive urban landscapes of derelict factories and warehouses, 
wasteland, idle wharves and motionless cranes testify to the loss 
of livelihoods. Unemployment figures and indices of deprivation 
testify to the failure of the adjusting economy to replace these 
livelihoods, despite a decade of urban policy directed at the old 
inner cities.
A radical new approach to tackling the problems in those areas
of greatest dereliotion was announced by Michael Heseltine, the
*
Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment , in September 
1979; urban development corporations (UDCs) operating in designated 
urban development areas (UDAs) (Heseltine, 1979b). It was proposed 
that UDCs be set-up in the London Docklands and in the !lMerseyside 
Dock Area11. Modelled on the new town development corporations 
(NTDCs), UDCs represent a significant departure in several respects 
from the then inner city policy based on partnership arrangements 
between local and central government. The corporations will be run 
by a board appointed by the Secretary of State, will have powers to
Further reference to Secretary of State for the Environment is 
abbreviated to Secretary of State.
assume many of the important functions hitherto undertaken by local 
authorities —  housing, planning, roads, building and development 
control and will be given unprecedented powers of urban land 
acquisition and disposal.
The aim of a UDC is specified in the enabling legislation:
"The object of an urban development corporation 
shall be to secure the regeneration of its area.
The object is to be achieved in particular by the 
following means (or by such of them as seem to the 
Corporation to be appropriate in the case of its area), 
namely, by bringing land and buildings into effective 
use, encouraging the development of existing and new 
industry and commerce, creating an attractive environ­
ment and ensuring that housing and social facilities 
are available to encourage people to live and work 
in the area".
(Local Government, Planning and Land Act, 1980, XVI, 136)$
an ambitious but hardly contentious aim. The advent of UDCs, 
however, was greeted by only limited support outside the Conservative 
Party and the property development industry, by mild discontent on 
Merseyside and by wholehearted opposition in London from local 
authorities, community groups, trade unions, the Labour Party and 
voluntary organisations.
Opponents of UDCs, in general and in particular, developed a 
strong case which was presented to the Government during the 
legislative process (Figure1.l). Nevertheless, the enabling 
legislation was enacted with the UDC proposals scarcely altered 
from their original NTDC-type formulation. The parliamentary 
orders required to establish the London Docklands Development 
Corporation and the Merseyside Development Corporation were then
FIGURE 1
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1_ URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS: 
THE COURSE OF EVENTS
Michael Heseltine, in a statement on inner 
city policy, proposes UDCs for London 
Docklands and the Merseyside Dock Area. 
Immediate opposition, particularly in London.
Enabling legislation introduced into House 
of Lords as part of Local Government,
Planning and Land Bill - Bill rejected.
Proposal that a UDC replace GEAR made by 
Scottish Office to the local authorities 
and SDA.
Enabling legislation reintroduced. Local 
Government, Planning and Land (No. 2) Bill.
Michael Heseltine announces shadow chairmen 
and deputy chairmen for the London and 
Merseyside UDCs.
UDC proposal for GEAR withdrawn by Scottish 
Office.
Royal Assent to Local Government, Planning 
and Land Act 1980.
Statutory instruments to establish the London 
Docklands Development Corporation and Mersey­
side Development Corporation laid before 
Parliament —  14 days to petition against 
the Orders.
Twelve petitions lodged against London 
Docklands UDC Order. Single petition 
lodged against Merseyside UDC is later 
withdrawn.
Hearings before a House of Lords Select 
Committee of the London UDC Order begin 
—  scheduled for two weeks.
Merseyside Development Corporation officially 
established. Hearings of the London UDC 
Order enter seventh week.
laid before Parliament. The Government had also suggested that a 
UDC should replace the unique arrangement between the Scottish 
Development Agency and the local authorities operating in the 
Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project which had been set up 
in 1976, though this proposal was withdrawn after opposition from 
the local authorities. The Order to establish the Merseyside 
Development Corporation was affirmed by Parliament on 1 April 1981, 
however, that for the London Docklands Development Corporation was 
entering its sixth week of hearings before a Select Committee of 
the House of Lords.
Despite the yet early days of the UDC initiative, the issue 
is already fraught with questions demanding to be answered. V/hy 
should a UDC proposal provoke such opposition from those people in 
whose interests it is purportedly designed? Why does this opposition, 
which included much constructive criticism, appear to have had no 
bearing on the legislative outcome of the proposal? Yet, in the 
case.of GEAR, the UDC suggestion was withdrawn after comparatively 
mild resistance! Are UDCs simply examples of uninformed policy­
making as the Director of the Town and Country Planning Association 
has suggested?
"It is as though the Government had had no previous 
experience of planning and local government in this 
country but had emerged in a mood of vigorous naivete 
from some other world".
(David Hall quoted in Planning, 8 February 1980).
Where does the justification for UDCs lie?
Given identification of some justification for UDCs, it will 
follow to make an assessment of their implications for the areas
in which they are established and, more generally, for the future 
of policy for such areas. UDCs are allegedly experimental 
(Heseltine, 1979b, P* 3)> but so is all public policy to some extent 
though one does not conduct experiments on such a scale and with 
such powers unless one has a high degree of confidence in the 
direction being taken. Even should the proposal for a UDC in 
London Docklands be rejected, an outcome which is becoming less 
doubtful as the House of Lords hearings continue beyond their 
originally scheduled two weeks, the idea of a UDC has been mooted 
before and will probably be mooted again. Lomas (1980) has written 
of "the dawn of the UDC era".
Response to the UDC proposals has been somewhat clouded by 
rhetoric and shrouded by uncertainty, but their appearance has 
generated ample material upon which to base a search for their 
underlying reasoning. Furthermore, an idea of the style of 
operation which the UDCs will adopt can be gained because shadow 
chairmen and deputy chairmen were appointed in February 1980 since 
when the embyonic bodies have taken shape with the recruitment of 
staff and the contracting of consultants in anticipation of 
parliamentary ratification of the Orders. The London Docklands case, 
which concerns a far greater area and number of people than that on 
Merseyside, having proved the more contentious also provides the 
greater availability of sources. Alongside these two cases, the 
situation of the GEAR project is studied in order to determine the 
nature of its relevance to the UDC issue. However, to first 
establish an approach to an understanding of the meaning and 
significance of UDCs, it is necessary to examine their practical
and theoretical context; that is, the central state’s involvement in 
inner city policy, of which UDCs are the most recent initiative.
The Inner City Policy Experience
The recent evolution of a distinct field of inner city policy 
in Britain has been well documented in several places (NCDP, 1977a-; 
Edwards and Batley, 1978; McKay and Cox, 1979)• Here, the development 
of policy through a series of initiatives is traced only briefly, 
leading to a review of the state of the art at the time UDCs emerged.
The announcement of the Urban Programme by Harold Wilson in May 
1968 is usually credited as the beginning of inner oity policy. The 
awareness of urban problems in the inner cities had been steadily 
increasing during the 1960s, though establishment of the Programme 
was precipitated by the prospect of a firing of the racial tension 
in many inner areas and the result was a "hastily concocted policy" 
(Edwards and Batley, 1978) and "hardly comprehensive" (McKay and 
Cox, 1979)* Under the Urban Programme, the Home Office provided 
local authorities with grants mainly for health, welfare, education 
and housing projects in "areas of severe social deprivation". The 
form of the Programme drew largely on the experience of the United 
States Poverty Programme and on the ideas of "positive discrimina­
tion" which had been espoused in the Plowden Report on primary 
education in 1966 and were later instituted in the form of 
Educational Priority Areas. Underlying the policy was the 
assumption of a "culture of poverty" explanation of urban 
dep rivation; a belief that poor social conditions bred further 
deprivation in a vicious circle which could then be broken by the 
localised spending of extra government money on selected programmes.
Further contributions to the form of early inner city policy 
came from the ideas on improving the efficiency of local government 
in the 1968 report of the Seebohm Committee and on community parti­
cipation in local government and planning in the 1969 Skeffington 
Report. Alongside the Urban Programme, the Home Office set up 
twelve Community Development Projects (CDPs), several of them in 
inner urban areas, aimed at "finding new ways of meeting the needs 
of people living in areas of high social deprivation; by bringing 
together the work of all the social services under the leadership 
of a special project team and also by tapping resources of self help 
and mutual help which may exist among the people in the neighbour­
hoods" (Home Office Press Release, 16 July 1969)* The CDPs were 
experiments in "action research", though many of the research teams 
soon extended their work to challenging the very assumptions upon 
which the CDPs and Urban Programme were based (NCDP, 1977a* 1977b).
The message from the CDPs was the view that urban deprivation 
was less a phenomenon of the inner areas themselves than a symptom 
of national economic difficulties and change and of the structure 
of capitalist society. Accordingly, they proposed radical policy 
changes which gained little acceptance although, on the other hand, 
there was growing support of the immediate criticism that small-scale 
area approaches could be of only marginal benefit to inner city 
residents, offering palliatives to symptoms while failing to tackle 
the causes. Indeed, problems in the inner cities were proving 
persistent, if not growing, and in the early 1970s a number of new 
initiatives were taken by both the Home Office and by the new 
"super-Department" of the Environment (DoE). The Home Office set up
an Urban Deprivation Unit and instituted a few experimental 
Neighbourhood Schemes and Comprehensive Community Programmes, but 
the main developments were occurring within the DoE.
The Conservative Secretary of State, Peter Walker, announced 
in 1972 that the DoE would develop a "total approach to the urban 
environment" through studies to be undertaken by consultants in 
three towns and three inner city areas; the latter to examine the 
"environmental problems....and the possible courses of action to 
deal with them (to) provide lessons on the power, resources and 
techniques which the Department and local authorities will need to 
deal with the problems of our inner areas generally" (DoE Press 
Release, 9 June 1972). The final reports of the Inner Area Studies 
were published in 1977* detailing the serious industrial and housing 
problems, the inadequate social services and other related problems 
in the areas studied in Liverpool, London and Birmingham. The 
reports stressed, however, that the plethora of problems were 
fundamentally economic in origin with the decline of local economic 
bases the result of moves in the national economy. The findings 
from the Inner Area Studies provided a major input to a White Paper, 
Policy for the Inner Cities (HMSO, 1977)* in which a long-awaited 
major rethink of inner city policy was set out.
The reappraisal of government policy was outlined in February 
1977 at the "Save our Cities" Conference in Bristol by Peter Shore, 
the Labour Secretary of State:
"There is to my mind one outstanding conclusion from 
all the research and development work of the past 
few years, from the Community Development Projects,
the Urban Programme, the Comprehensive Community 
Programmes and above all the Inner Area Studies, 
and it is this.
If we are to make real headway in improving 
the conditions of our inner city areas we must use 
the main programmes of central and local government. 
We cannot rely solely, or even mainly, on extra 
initiatives such as the Urban Programme or Educa­
tional Priority Areas. These provide valuable 
topping up, and help to ameliorate problems. But 
if we are to get to grips with the underlying 
economic and social forces, we must deploy the 
major instruments of government policy."
(Quoted by McKay and Cox, 1979* P* 252).
The June 1977 White Paper set out the new policy, proposing three 
broad areas of change which were subsequently taken up by the 
Government.
The first initiative was to give national and local policies 
and programmes an "inner city dimension" by gearing them to inner 
areas through such means as the Rate Support Grant, education, 
health, housing and transport programmes, and changing the objectives 
for the granting of Industrial Development Certificates and of the 
Location of Offices Bureau. Second, there was a consolidation of 
the existing inner city initiatives with the Urban Programme, the 
Urban Deprivation Unit and the Comprehensive Community Programmes 
trasnferred from the Home Office to the DoE (all central government 
responsibility for the highly critical CDPs had been relinquished 
by 1977)* The scope of the Urban Programme was extended to include 
industrial, environmental and recreational projects and the total 
funding under the Programme increased substantially from £30 million 
in 1975/76 to £125 million by 1979/80.
Third, the White Paper recommended the creation of Inner City 
Partnerships between local and central government in some of the 
larger areas in an attempt to bring together in a coordinated 
strategy all public authorities and agencies whose policies were 
of importance to the areas. Through the Partnerships, local 
government action, the adjusted central government policies and 
programmes and the spending of the increased Urban Programme funds 
(£75 million of the £125 million budgeted for 1979/80 was allocated 
to Partnership areas) would be coordinated in Inner Area Programmes. 
These Programmes, modelled on the Housing Investment Programme and 
the Transport Policies and Programmes, were to be three-year rolling 
programmes submitted annually to the DoE; an attempt to attack the 
problems of the inner areas through a corporate plan involving 
several areas of government. The White Paper further proposed that 
design of the Programmes involve the "entire community" by working 
with local community and residents’ groups, voluntary organisations, 
chambers of commerce, local firms, the Confederation of British 
Industry and the Trades Union Congress. The Partnerships were to be 
the main arm of the new policy for the inner cities.
Seven Inner City Partnerships were set up in the inner areas 
of Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester/Salford, Newcastle/Gateshead 
and, in London, in Lambeth, Docklands and Hackney/lslington. The 
Partnership Committees, comprising leading councillors from the two 
tiers of local government and Ministers from the DoE and other 
relevant Whitehall departments with a representative from the Area 
Health Authority, prepared the first round of Inner Area Programmes 
which were submitted to the DoE through the latter part of 1978.
The first round of Inner Area Programmes have been reviewed by 
Nabarro (1980) who identified a failure by the Partnerships to take 
the opportunity to devise joint policies to tackle inner area 
problems. Instead, there has been a tendency for the extra funds 
to be used simply to supplement existing programmes, particularly 
capital projects which involve the least future revenue commitment. 
Thus, 80% of the spending in the first Programmes was devoted to 
economic development, environmental improvement and leisure and 
recreation projects with little thought of how the projects 
contributed to solving the problems in the area. Several weaknesses 
in the Partnership arrangement have also been identified by other 
critics (Tilley, 1979* Lawless, 1980; Hambleton, 1981 and Deakin ). 
The arrangements have been seen as unnecessarily bureacratic and 
centralist with the corporate structure tending to push decision­
making upwards to the effect that, "among equal partners, the DoE 
is more equal than the others". With DoE approval required for the 
Programmes, only projects thought likely to gain approval from 
central government are submitted. The Partnerships have been 
criticised for their lack of community involvement, excluding 
interests thought crucial to successful inner city regeneration 
such as local business, trade unions and the voluntary sector, 
despite the sentiments expressed in the 1977 White Paper. When 
the Lambeth Partnership did set up and fund a group of local interest 
representatives, central government was decidedly reluctant. Many
*
N. Deakin, "Inner City Policy: The London Experience". Seminar
given in Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of 
Glasgow, 26 January 1981•
of the Whitehall departments have chosen to retain their autonomy 
and have been unwilling to "bend" mainstream programmes toward 
inner areas. Generally, the resources at the Partnerships’ 
disposal were considered far from adequate in relation to the 
problems which the Partnerships were intended to solve and, in all, 
there appears a great gulf between the reality of the Partnerships 
and the enthusiasm with which the new policy was launched in 1977-
Nabarro claimed, however, that the greatest weakness of the 
Partnerships was a failure to think critically about the structural 
factors affecting the inner city (1980, p. 35)- The main development 
in thinking on inner city policy since its beginnings in 1968 has 
been the shift in perspective from a narrow social pathology approach 
to one which recognises inner city problems as fundamentally due 
to economic forces operating on a national, if not international, 
scale. This structural perspective has been widely held, albeit with 
differing views on solutions, first by the CDPs, then by the Inner 
Area Studies and repeated in the 1977 White Paper. The policies 
proposed in the White Paper, however, demonstrated a belief by 
Government that the play of national economic forces could be 
confronted essentially by consolidating and extending the area-based 
and managerial "solutions" of old.
As the recession has deepened across Britain and the areas of 
deprivation on urban peripheries and elsewhere have been "discovered", 
the conditions in the inner urban areas have become less striking and 
have been seen more in terms of the degree to which they suffer from 
a far broader problem. Accordingly, the merits of an inner city
policy centred on seven selected inner urban areas have been 
increasingly questioned. Several writers in a recent volume 
(Cameron, 1980) have argued that the focus of attention should be 
at the level of the conurbation and the research for "The Inner City 
in Context" series of monographs suggested that the level of analysis 
would be better based on metropolitan labour markets than on the
ti n *inner city, assuming the inner city can be defined. Others maintain 
that policy needs to be pitched at the structure of the capitalist 
economic system (NCDP, 1977b; Conference of Socialist Planners,
1980).
The experience of inner city policy in Britain, however, has 
been one of a divorce between policy and thinking with the 
developments in policy largely resisting the changes suggested by 
practitioners, academic research and acknowledged by government in 
a curiously bi-partisan manner. While not belittling those benefits 
which inner city policy has brought to inner areas, the policy has 
never come to grips with the problems and numerous initiatives have 
fallen short of the expectations they had engendered. The experience 
was succinctly described in the title of a recent newspaper review 
of the Partnerships;
"The inner city programmes have survived, but can
the inner cities?".
(Guardian. 1 April 1981, p. 22).
D. Diamond, "Is there an Inner City Problem". Seminar given in 
Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Glasgow, 
10 February 1981.
14.
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives on State Intervention
To understand UDCs, it is necessary to understand the nature 
of state intervention in inner cities. Why has inner city policy 
followed the course described above? Although there are numerous 
interpretations of the role of the state and, accordingly, explana­
tions of the pattern of state intervention (see the various perspect­
ives in Loney and Allen, 1979), two broad schools of thought can be 
identified; those which see the state as a neutral instrument and 
those which assign to the state an inherent bias towards certain 
groups in society.
The analyses of Edwards and Batley (1978) and McKay and Cox 
(1979) are good examples of the widely-held first category.
Combining pluralist and managerialist perspectives they have, 
respectively, tried to explain the development of the Urban Programme 
and of inner city policy by reference to the actions of various 
groups which are seen 11 to shape the policy agenda"; political parties, 
organised professional and economic interests, protest movements, 
central government and local government bureaucracies. The state 
is seen solely as the administrative clearing house for the various 
and conflicting demands placed upon government. After conducting 
their reviews of state intervention in specific policy areas the 
general conclusions arrived at are that the Urban Programme and 
other associated initiatives were "more the children of enthusiasm 
than wisdom" (Edwards and Batley, 1978, p. 251) and that "the state's 
role in urban society has been highly variable" (McKay and Cox, 1979,
p. 262).
Dunleavy (1980), however, argues that such conclusions are 
indicative of an inadequate framework of analysis. One needs to 
explain why state intervention often appears confusing or contra­
dictory and the suggestion is that the role or roles of the state 
must he examined rather than ignored. An increasing amount of work 
is being undertaken on the basis that the state does play a specific 
and positive role in determining the nature of urban policy 
(Pickvance, 1976; Dearlove, 1979; Saunders, 1979; Dunleavy, 1980).
Within this second broad school of thought on the role of the 
state, the crudest interpretation is that the state in capitalist 
society operates solely in the interests of the capitalist class. 
However, the observable reality of who benefits from state inter­
vention refutes such a simplistic assertion and increasingly attempts 
have been made to adapt theories of the role of the state to 
accommodate the apparent confusion and contradictions of reality. 
Despite differences in explaining how the state performs its roles, 
it is generally accepted within this field that the capitalist state 
needs to carry out two basic functions which are often mutually 
contradictory:
"... the state must try to maintain or create the 
conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is 
possible. However, the state also must try to maintain 
or create the conditions of social harmony. A capital­
ist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help 
one class accumulate capital at the expense of other 
classes loses.its legitimacy and hence undermines the 
basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that 
ignores the necessity of assisting the process of 
capital accumulation risks drying up the source of 
its own power, the economy's surplus production 
capacity and the taxes drawn from this surplus".
(O'Connor, 1973, p. 6)
An Approach to Understanding Urban Development Corporations
With respect to identifying an approach to understanding TJDCs, 
the essential difference between the two schools of thought on the 
nature of state intervention is that one suggests an explanation 
can be found primarily in the problems of inner cities, whereas the 
other suggests an adequate explanation can only be gained by looking 
at the problems inherent in state intervention. The first sees 
inner city policy as a somewhat separate policy area, the form of 
which is constrained by national interests, rather than largely 
determined by national interests as the second approach would 
suggest (McKay and Cox, 1979* P« 278).
Paced with these two possible approaches to understanding 
TJDCs, the search for the logic of TJDCs begins by adopting the 
orthodox, though challenged, approach of looking at the problems 
and policies of the areas in question in an attempt to provide an 
adequate explanation. That is, the assumption that TJDCs are 
designed, as the enabling legislation states, "to secure the 
regeneration of their areas".
CHAPTER 2
LARGE SCALE URBAN REGENERATION: STRATEGIES AND PROELMS
Michael Heseltine*s Review of Inner City Policy
The TJ.D.C. proposals emerged from a review of inner city policy, 
specifically the partnership arrangements, conducted by the D.o.E. 
for Michael Heseltine after the Conservative Government came to 
office in May 1979* The announcement of the partnerships in 1977 
had been broadly welcomed by the Conservative opposition although 
they would have preferred less central government subsidies and 
more incentives for the private sector in the strategy. Michael 
Heseltine, then Opposition spokesman on the environment, had 
suggested, "The sums of money Mr. Shore is offering are so small 
and so spread over the years in relation to the scale of the problem 
that he is giving a false impression in suggesting that there are 
any real solutions to the problem". (Quoted in McKay and Cox, 1979*
P. 254).
Apart from the different emphasis favoured by the Conservatives 
within the general commitment by both major parties to redirecting 
resources back to inner areas, the first critical assessments of 
the partnerships were appearing. Peter Shore, understandably, 
defended the partnerships. While acknowledging the criticisms, he 
claimed to be persuaded by none of them and, moreover, suggested it 
was impossible to evaluate the innovation after just two years of 
practice (Shore, 1980, p. 20). There was, however, a general view 
that the partnerships were not living up to the promises of 1977
and a growing lack of confidence in their ability to address the 
problems for which they were designed (McKay and Cox, 1979* p. 253)• 
Michael Heseltine’s review of the inner city partnerships 
concluded:-
"We inherited from the previous Government a 
complex machinery for urban aid. I think Government 
must continue to be involved —  though with the 
minimum of paperwork and fuss, and I intend to 
simplify procedures.
 We think that the partnership approach and the
inner area programmes, which the partnerships and 
the programme authorities produce, have served a 
useful role.
 But their limited gain has been clouded by the
bureaucratic scale and frequency of the procedures 
whereby too many people meet to discuss generalisa­
tions, often to little purpose.
Equally, the initial intention to involve the 
private sector has faded; and we need to emphasise 
again the role of voluntary organisations.
 I believe that the existing machinery, stream­
lined and adjusted, will be capable of carrying 
developments forward in the inner cities and enable 
local government and the private sector to fulfil 
their respective roles. But for London Docklands 
and the Merseyside Dock Area I do not think that 
the present arrangements can meet the particular 
problems and opportunities of those two areas."
(Heseltine, 1979* pp. 2-3).
So, what were the particular problems of and opportunities in 
regenerating the London Docklands and the Merseyside Dock Area?
What were the strengths and weaknesses of the different arrangements 
for coordinating government in those areas; an inner city partner­
ship in Liverpool and a statutory joint committee of local authorities 
together with an inner city partnership in the London Docklands? 
Additionally, what was the situation with GEAR in Glasgow which 
first attracted then repelled a TJ.D.C. proposal?
19.
2.2 Liverpool: An Inner City Partnership
The "Merseyside Dock Area" is a narrow band of docks and 
quaysides extending along both sides of the river and comprising 
parts of the City of Liverpool and the boroughs of Sefton and Wirr&l 
within the Merseyside County Council area (Figure 2.1). The port 
has been the traditional base of Liverpool's economy but, since the 
1980s, has been in decline as the pattern of Britain's trade has 
shifted away from the 'deep sea markets' of Africa, Asia and the 
Americas towards Europe; a destination to which Liverpool as a 
port is ill-suited. The remaining trade is increasingly handled 
by capital-intensive techniques such as containerisation which have 
not only accelerated redundancies in the docks work force but also 
led to the abandonment of many old docks in favour of new installa­
tions such as the Seaforth container terminal downstream.
When the South Docks closed in 1972, great interest was 
generated among community groups regarding their potential for 
redevelopment and the City Planning Department issued guidelines 
designed to assist developers interested in use of the area (Amos, 
1972). The guidelines were based on the principle of using the 
docks for development which would help provide for the needs of 
employment and open space in the docks' 'hinterland'. However, 
nothing eventuated. Private developers appeared uninterested and 
neither the city nor the county authority had the funds, considering 







V-/o [ton on i_
f|Lfhe H i l t  C
No  r n s  
Greer
Lifeboai. St r i
Cer/i'Y'C\Jowe,
B r ig h to n  j \  |
'  W t ;S t_
1 D e r b y
■t- \ Infmyi
g remon  1
\  Knotty. VAshl*
Un/ERPOOL INNER C\TY
p a r t n e r s h ip  a r e a
5cocor'be








-C a lle rs  to n
■' ’■ V\ * •
M//\Q3d
w  *
ST. M ICHAEL'S  STAY.
G <vstb.v[ 5:;. Kecks’
The decline of Liverpool’s port function has had repercussions 
throughout the city's economy with the decline of associated 
manufacturing and service industry. Compounding these employment 
losses, the national recession of the 1970s has fallen heavily on 
Merseyside where the level of manufacturing activity is largely 
in the hands of a few large externally controlled concerns; most 
in vulnerable or non-growth sectors. The "rationalisation” of 
national and multi-national firms in the straitened economic climate 
has produced a continuing catalogue of large plant closures or 
contractions on Merseyside; British Leyland, Pressed Steel Fisher, 
Dunlop, Plessey, Tate and Lyle (documented in Merseyside in Crisis. 
Merseyside Socialist Research Group, 1980).
The severity of the losses to Merseyside's economic base is 
the context in which the 'traditional' inner city problems occur.
One part of inner Liverpool, was the subject of one
of the inner area studies (Wilson, et. al., 1977) which provided 
the basis for the 1977 White Paper on inner city policy. Sub­
sequently, Liverpool City was announced in October 1977 as one of 
the seven areas in which inner city partnerships would be established. 
The designated area (Figure 2.1) included the south docks as well 
as much of the operational north docks.
The Partnership arrangements in Liverpool (Figure 2.2), consist 
of a Partnership Committee of representatives from central govern­
ment, the City and County Councils and the area health authority 
operating in conjunction with Liverpool City Council and guided 
by an Inner Areas Sub-Committee composed of members of the City 
and County Councils. The expressed aims of the Partnership were
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to secure the economic, social and environmental regeneration of 
inner Liverpool and were translated into objectives of halting the 
population decline, reducing the selective out-migration of younger 
and skilled residents and preventing further job loss and unemploy­
ment (Liverpool Inner City Partnership Committee, 1978)•
Within the broad aims of the Partnership and among the multi­
farious projects to which Partnership funds were directed, an 
emphasis soon occurred involving a shift away from proposals such 
as those connected with improving social services and leisure 
facilities toward those facilitating industrial development:
"Increasingly it is becoming accepted that the 
local authority has a role to play in the development 
of the local economy. In particular as a part of the 
Inner City Partnership, economic or, more specifically, 
employment related matters are assuming major importance".
(Liverpool City Planning Department, 1978)*
This emphasis was repeated in the Merseyside Structure Plan, based 
on an urban regeneration strategy which saw local authorities as 
the most important agencies. (Merseyside County Council, 1980).
Both Liverpool City Council and Merseyside County Council 
have bodies aimed at economic development. The Liverpool Economic 
Development Agency markets industrial and commercial land in the 
City and the Merseyside County Economic Development Office promotes 
economic development throughout the County. The Partnership offered 
an opportunity, at least in the designated areas, to coordinate the 
efforts directed at re-establishing Liverpool’s economic base. These 
efforts included a number of schemes: advance factory construction
under the Partnership arrangements, through Department of Industry 
schemes and by the private sector; site preparation, particularly
in the Partnership area possibly assisted by grants from the 
Regional Development Fund of the European Economic Commission; 
financial assistance to local employers by grants, loans or 
guarantees from central and local government, with the highest 
levels payable within the Partnership area; and the designation of 
Industrial and Commercial Improvement Areas under the Inner Urban 
Areas Act 1978 with associated provision of loans and grants for 
environmental improvements and for the conversion, extension and 
improvement of buildings. Partnership funds have also been put 
toward establishing an ’Industrial Development Agency’ which will 
be responsible for industrial promotion, liaison with the private 
sector and the processing of loans and grants.
The City Council describes its measures with an air of 
optimism; the City Council is
”...making every effort to encourage industry and, in 
particular, the Inner City Partnership arrangements 
with Central Government are aimed at tackling the 
problems of the inner areas of the City and the re­
generation of the local economy. This will be of 
considerable benefit to the private sector. Assistance 
from both central and local Government sources is 
available to assist the establishment and/or expansion 
of both existing and new firms....”
(Liverpool City Planning Department, 1979a-)*
but to what avail? The enormity, and perhaps the futility, of the 
task is indicated by the fact that the Partnership’s proposals for 
attracting new industry and commerce, if successful, would mean 
5,500 new jobs by 1984/85 equivalent to the number of redund­
ancies in the British Leyland and Dunlop plans in just one year.
Considering the extent of dereliction in inner Liverpool, it 
is surprising that one reason why the Partnership’s proposals might
not be realised is land availability. A review of development 
land in the Partnership area in 1979 (Liverpool City Planning 
Department, 1979b) revealed 480 hectares of vacant or unused land, 
about one quarter of which was dockland mostly owned by the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC), a combination of statutory under­
taker and private company after having been bailed out of bankruptcy 
with government funds. The review identified the principal problem 
in redevelopment of the docklands to be land acquisition from the 
MDHC and statutory undertakers; the problem caused by disincentives 
to the release of such land, stemming from the methods of valuing 
land and calculating liability for development land tax and from 
the preference of some owners to retain an option on possible 
future use of the land and so being only prepared to grant short­
term leases. In the absence of any change in the legislation and 
regulations which govern the holding and disposal of publicly owned 
land, the review predicted the Partnership’s operations would be 
severely constrained, and concluded:
’’The process of arbitration by the Secretary of State 
as suggested in his recent ’Statement on the Disposal 
of Public Sector Land’ is clearly a current require­
ment in the context of this Partnership and needs to 
be instituted as quickly as possible’’. (Liverpool City 
Planning Department, 1979b, p. 6).
The City Council had attempted to arrange redevlopment of two 
areas of disused docks, one of them in association with the County 
Council, but even after years of negotiating with the MDHC and the 
British Transport Dock Board:
’’...despite plans for bringing disused public sector 
land into use, with the local authorities willing to 
organise predevelopment and finance it from the Urban 
Programme or the Housing Strategies and Investment 
Programme, no progress is being made towards this 
goal”.
(Liverpool City Planning Department, 1979b, P* 5)*
Meanwhile, the County Council had been negotiating with the MDHC 
with regard to gaining an option on the leasehold of the South 
Docks and Wirral Council had spent some Urban Programme funds on 
environmental improvement of derelict docks. Nevertheless, 
considering the amount of vacant land elsewhere in inner Liverpool, 
there has been no great pressure on an early decision on the future 
of the disused docks.
London Docklands: A Statutory Joint Committee and Inner City
Partnership
Redevelopment of London’s docklands (Figure 2.3)* unlike those 
on Merseyside, has been the subject of considerable discussion and 
activity for several years. Large areas of upstream dockland have 
become unused as development of the Port of London has moved down­
stream, particularly to Tilbury, to accommodate changes in cargo 
handling techniques. The East India Docks closed in 1967* the St. 
Katharine and London Docks in 1968 and the Surrey Docks in 1970.
By 1980, only the Royal Docks in Beckton and the West India and 
Millwall Docks on the Isle of Dogs were still operational, though 
the Port of London Authority (PLA) had cast the future of the 
latter in doubt on several occasions since the early 1970s.
The docks, however, form only the heart of what is known as 
’’Docklands”; an area of 5500 acres, the home of 50,000 people and 
comprising parts of the five ’’Dockland Boroughs” of Greenwich, 
Lewisham, Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets. Docklands extends 
about eight miles along both banks of the Thames from the London 
Docks, just below Tower Bridge, in the west,to Beckton in the east.
















among just a few large "bodies. In 1975» 2,047 acres were owned by 
the PLA, 840 by the GLC, 700 by the British Gas Corporation, 528 by 
the Dockland Boroughs and 143 by British Rail. Supplementing the 
land brought into disuse by dock closures, much of the Gas Board’s 
land holding in the area had become unused as the Board’s operations 
had shifted toward the North Sea gas installations elsewhere in the 
country.
As on Merseyside, the acres of derelict land were only the most 
visible part of broader problems throughout the surrounding area and, 
insofar as the problems of Docklands can be covered in a single 
paragraph:
’’East London, and particularly Docklands, grew up at about 
the same time as the older industrial areas in the Midlands
and North of the country. During the last war, it was the
most heavily bombed civilian target in the country. Since 
then, apart from the more insidious decline in population, 
many docks closed in quick succession. Now it has all 
the symptoms of decline of the older urban areas of
the country, many of which have long since been recog­
nised as needing special help towards improvement....
The signs are the overall economic, housing, transport 
and environmental state of Docklands and the Docklands 
boroughs and the rate at which things are deteriorating”.
(DJC, 1976, p. 13).
When the dock closures began, various schemes to use the land 
were proposed (an Olympic stadium and a ’’Tivoli Gardens” have been 
perennial suggestions) and strategies to regenerate the area were 
also conceived on a regional scale, notably with respect to the 
search for a third London Airport. However, it was recognised that 
redevelopment of the area needed to be tackled in a comprehensive 
manner and, in 1971* the Secretary of State and the GLC commissioned 
a consultancy firm, R. Travers, Morgan & Partners, to formulate a 
number of options for the way redevelopment could proceed.
The consultants reported in January 1973* suggesting five 
possible courses for redevelopment which were referred to as 
"Thames Park", "East End Consolidated", "Waterside", "City New Town" 
and "Europa". A consultation exercise undertaken by the GLC and 
the Dockland Boroughs followed, from which it was clear the people 
of Docklands held substantial support for none of the proposals. 
Indeed, opposition to the Travers Morgan proposals led to the 
formation in 1973 of the Joint Docklands Action Group (JDAG), an 
umbrella group for community and trade union organisations in the 
Docklands, with the aim "to ensure that any redevelopment in the 
Docklands meets the needs, first and foremost, of local people in 
East London"; a consideration to which the consultants had paid 
little heed.
Although the Travers Morgan proposals were rejected, the study 
had provided much information on the problems that comprehensive 
redevelopment of Docklands would entail, leading to the suggestion 
that the then current administrative system would be inadequate.
This viewpoint was accepted by the Boroughs, GLC and Secretary of 
State who entered into discussion on possible arrangements for 
some form of "special machinery to plan and implement the redevelop­
ment of Docklands". In January 1974* the Docklands Joint Committee 
(DJC) was established under provisions of the Local Government 
Act 1972 and the Docklands area (Figure 2.3 ) over which the DJC 
would function was defined.
The DJC (Figure 2.4) cons is ted of 24 members; 8 from the GLC;
2 from each of the Boroughs of Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets; 
one each from the Boroughs of Greenwich and Lewisham; and 8 from
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elsewhere appointed by the local authority members but with "regard 
to any nominations made for this purpose by the Secretary of State", 
The Committee was vested with no powers additional to those of the 
constituent local authorities and was essentially an instrument of 
coordination with the local authorities responsible for implementa­
tion, The terms of reference given in the Standing Orders of the 
Docklands Joint Committee include
- to decide on a planning brief and outline plan
for the area;
- to coordinate the preparation by the appointing
authorities of local plans in accord with the 
outline plan;
- to coordinate and advise on proposals for local
authority development in the area;
- to consider and advise on proposals of any of the
local authorities to enter into agreements with 
private developers or statutory undertakers to 
develop land, or to enter into such agreements 
itself on behalf of a local authority.
To provide for public consultation and participation at this 
new level of planning, the Docklands Forum was also established in 
1974, representing the voluntary sector, trades councils, chambers 
of commerce, trades unions and other local groups. Two members of 
the Forum sat on the DJC. The DJC have also funded a resource 
centre to support JDAG which was, in turn, represented on the Forum, 
A full list of organisations represented on the Forum and of members 
of the DJC in 1978 is given in Appendix A. .
The London Docklands Strategic Plan (DJC, 1978) was published 
and approved in July 1978, setting out a strategy for the phased 
redevelopment of the whole area until "1997 and the completion of 
development". The overall objective of the Plan was:
"To use the opportunity provided by large areas of 
London's Dockland becoming available, to redress the 
housing, social, environmental, employment/economic 
and communications deficiencies of the Docklands area 
and the parent boroughs, and thereby, to provide the 
freedom for similar improvement throughout East and 
Inner London",
(me, 1976, p. 14).
and in pursuit of this objective, the DJC identified two issues 
crucial to success of the Plan:
employment and transport infrastructure. Unless 
the economic base of Docklands can be recreated, all 
other efforts will be wasted; and that recreation 
depends to a very considerable extent on the provision 
of adequate facilities for moving people and goods".
(DJC, 1976, p. 2).
The Plan had widespread support, including that from central 
government, and after many years of uncertainty and dubious 
proposals, it appeared that redevelopment of Docklands was to be 
a reality.
The basic structure of coordinated planning in Docklands, with 
the task of guiding this redevelopment, was elaborated in three 
main areas since its inception in 1974* First, the constituent 
authorities delegated to the DJC the functions of development control 
and of land acquisition under the Community Land Act 1975* A 
Development Applications Sub—Committee of the DJC was set up to 
decide on all applications for planning permission in the area apart 
from proposals of a minor nature, and the Docklands Land Board to 
carry out the community land functions. The local authorities, 
however, considered it neither necessary nor appropriate for the 
Land Board to be a development agency and its powers were, therefore, 
limited to the acquisition, preparation, management and disposal of 
land and buildings.
The second development came with the designation in 1977 of 
Docklands as one of the inner city partnership areas, thus introducing 
central government directly into the planning coordination machinery. 
The partnership was struck between central government and the DJC; 
the Partnership Committee comprising the Secretary of State, other 
government ministers, the chairman of the DJC, the leaders of the 
GLC and each of the Dockland Boroughs, the leader of the GLC 
Opposition and a representative from the Inner London Education 
Authority. Unlike the other inner city partnerships, the budgeting 
of Urban Programme funds in Docklands is considered not in a 
separate document but is integrated within the DJC’s Operational 
Programmes.
After completion of the Strategic Plan, the DJC had recognised 
that its work would take on two emphases; the coordination of 
development by the executive agencies and the promotion of Docklands 
as an area for industrial and commercial development. To manage 
the second emphasis, several courses were followed involving 
liaison with various bodies but this side of the operation has 
been consolidated within the Docklands Development Organisation 
(DDO), the officer support group to the DJC. The DDO’s objective 
with regard to promoting investment was:
"...to provide, by close and effective liaison among 
the various agencies, a skilled and efficient service 
which gives industrialists and developers comprehensive 
help in building or renting accommodation, in housing 
key workers, in obtaining grants, loans and permits 
and indeed in any aspect of their operations where 
the public sector can assist the private".
(DJC evidence to Expenditure Committee: House of Commons
Paper 99(ii), 1977-78, p. 33).
By 1978 then, the structure of organisations involved in the 
regeneration of London Docklands presented a daunting picture 
(Figure 2.4)* Nevertheless, streamlining of operation within the 
structure allowed the DJC to have confidence in the working 
operations and in the ability of the DDO to promote development.
The promotion strategy of the DDO was based on highlighting the 
locational advantages of Docklands with respect to existing national 
and international transport links, major markets and labour supply 
and, in particular, on outlining the progress being made under the 
London Docklands Strategic Plan (DDO, 1980). In 19799 the DJC 
undertook a review of the regeneration programme under the Plan 
since 1978 and concluded:
"...the implementation of Docklands development is 
broadly on course to reach the targets set in the 
Strategic Plan, despite the fact that some of the 
assumptions set in the Strategic Plan about the 
release of land for redevelopment have proved, so 
far, to be invalid".
(DJC, 1979, p. 35).
Although implementation may have been "broadly on course", 
progress was proving slower than had been expected. The basis of 
the 1978 Plan had been the assumption of a massive injection of 
both public and private resources into Docklands. Government 
spending cuts, however, were threatening many of the housing, 
transport, health and education proposals in the Plan despite the 
buffer provided by Urban Programme resources^ and industrial 
investment had not proceeded as predicted. Moreover, the employ­
ment predictions, upon which the scale of the industrial strategy 
had been based, had been unrealistic as manufacturing industry 
had continued to close throughout the area.
In evidence given to the Environment Sub-Committee of the 
Expenditure Committee in December 1978 and January 1979 (House of 
Commons Paper, 1978/79* No. 99)> the Secretary of State identified 
the main problem facing regeneration of the area as the failure of 
industrial investment on a sufficiently large scale to be attracted 
to the area "despite the very positive efforts which the Docklands 
local authorities are making" (House of Commons Paper No. 99(i)> 
p. 4). The DJC saw this problem as fundamentally that of an 
"unpropitious" national economic climate in which local government 
was having to make greater than expected efforts to retain let 
alone to attract industry (House of Commons Paper No. 99(ii)> P* 38)•
In the difficult economic circumstances, the DJC argued that 
the best it could do was to build up a confidence in the future of 
Docklands which would involve resolving a number of uncertainties; 
the release of statutory undertakers' land, the future levels of 
public spending, the future of the project to extend the Jubilee 
underground line which had been a key element in the 1978 Plan 
with the proposed extension of the line from the City to Woolwich 
in the east of Docklands, and the future of the Upper Docks on 
the Isle of Dogs; considerations which all lay outside the control 
of the DJC but which bore heavily on its operations.
The DJC had encountered similar problems with the release of 
land held by statutory undertakers to those faced on Merseyside 
and "in the medium and longer-term the achievement of the Strategic 
Plan's employment objectives will undoubtedly be jeopardised"
(House of Commons Paper No. 99(ii)» P* 37)* Further cuts in 
public spending were made in 1979* the PDA announced in June 1980
the closure of the West India and Millwall Docks, and, one month 
later, the GLC and Department of Transport jointly announced the 
cancellation of the Jubilee Line extension.
Glasgow: The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Project
In 1974* indices of deprivation calculated on the basis of 
1971 Census data, had revealed that Clydeside had almost 50% of the 
’worst' areas in Britain on several of the indicators. Within 
Clydeside, there was a further concentration of the "worst areas" 
in the East End of Glasgow. The rapid development of industry and 
housing in the area during the nineteenth century had been followed 
by decline during the twentieth; increasing unemployment, industrial 
dereliction, worsening housing conditions and accelerating outward 
migration. Formerly the "industrial power-house of Glasgow", the 
East End now contained the relics of the declining textile and 
heavy engineering industries and decaying tenements.
In 1957* twenty-nine Comprehensive Development Areas (CDAs) 
had been designated in Glasgow, many in the East End, though by 
1976 only nine had been undertaken and, in the others, premature 
demolition before funds were available for redevelopment had often 
added to the dereliction and blight. In areas such as the East 
End, where about 60% of the land was derelict, Glasgow's urban 
renewal strategy of CDAs linked with peripheral development and 
overspill was clearly not working. The perception of the need to 
rethink policy in Glasgow coincided with the developments in inner 
city ideas occurring elsewhere in Britain, though in Glasgow an 
independent "solution" was devised which preceded by nine months the 
appearance of inner city partnerships in England.
The GEAR project was announced by the Secretary of State for
Scotland in May 1978 with the objective to "bring about in a
coordinated way the comprehensive social, economic and environmental 
regeneration of the East End, and create the conditions for the 
development of a balanced and thriving community" (SDD, 1978, p. 1).
The basis for the project was the joint agreement of the Glasgow
District Council, the Strathclyde Regional Council, the Scottish 
Development Agency (SDA), and the Scottish Special Housing Associa­
tion (SSHA) with the Secretary of State for Scotland to work in 
partnership to tackle the problems of the East End, "in association 
with the people of the area and with other appropriate bodies, 
public and private, including voluntary organisations" (SDD, 1978, 
p. 1). The area to be covered by the project was delineated;
4,000 acres within the single local authority of Glasgow District 
and with a population of 45,000.
The central coordinating mechanism of the GEAR project (Figure 
2.5) is the Governing Committee consisting of members from the four 
initiating bodies with a Scottish Office Minister as chairman. The 
Governing Committee is responsible for the overall plan and programme 
of action for the area and is supported by a Consultative Group of 
senior officials, reflecting the membership of the Committee, with 
the task of day-to-day coordination. The other public agencies 
closely involved in the GEAR project are the Greater Glasgow Health 
Board, the Housing Corporation and the Manpower Services Commission 
(MSC), although these partners do not play a direct role in the 
formal structure of coordination.
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Where the GEAR arrangements differ notably from the attempts at 
coordination in Liverpool and London Docklands is in the nature of 
central government’s involvement in the partnership which is largely 
through the SDA. The SDA had been set up in November 1975 with two 
major objectives; economic development including the provision, 
maintenance and safeguarding of employment, and environmental 
improvement especially with respect to industrial dereliction.
Although ’’sponsored” by the Scottish Economic Planning Department 
of the Scottish Office, the SDA does have a certain degree of 
autonomy. Within GEAR, the SDA performs two roles: first, its
’’usual functions” of providing for and promoting industrial and 
commercial development, environmental improvement and land 
clearance; second, the SDA was assigned the function of coordination 
of the project, preparing overall policies and programmes which are 
submitted to the Governing Committee for approval with the Consulta­
tive Group attempting to ensure coordination in their implementation 
by the various partners.
Why this particular form of organisation structure was established 
for the regeneration of the East End of Glasgow remains a point of 
differing views with suggestions that important factors were the 
state 6f Scottish politics at the time, the availability of the 
recently created SDA as a lead institution, the redundancy of the 
development team from the abandoned Stonehouse New Town project 
(many of the staff went to the Urban Renewal Directorate of the SDA 
which was the section concerned with GEAR), and the Scottish Office 
not wishing to entrust the local authorities with the extra resources 
to be directed into inner Glasgow. The Chairman of the Governing
Committee later justified the organisation in terms suggesting 
uncertainty about how to tackle the problems of the GEAR area:
"While it must be acknowledged that there is no 
immediately available formula which will guarantee the 
success of the GEAR project, it is nevertheless clear 
that the best prospect, and perhaps the only one, will 
be through coordinated action in all the different 
areas of activity...."
(GEAR Governing Committee, 1978* P* 2).
Nevertheless, the 1977 White Paper on inner city policy recognised 
the GEAR project as an alternative to inner city partnerships, 
proposing support of the project through an increased allocation of 
Urban Programme funds to the area.
It was not until July 1978 that the Governing Committee issued 
a report setting out the key issues to be tackled and the possible 
courses of action in the GEAR project (GEAR Governing Committee, 
1978). The report identified the problem of urban decline as 
essentially a problem of economic change with many of the forces 
of change operating from outside the area. Accepting these limita­
tions on the scope of the project, the report stressed two considera­
tions in the approach to urban regeneration; the need to promote 
confidence in the area and to support the existing population:
"...a primary objective must be to create a new 
confidence in the East End. Only in this way will 
the present population be retained, industry be 
revived and the hopes and aspirations of the next 
generation in the area realised". (GEAR Governing 
Committee, 1978, p* 2).
and,
"...above all else the actual process of change
must be managed in a just and dignified manner which 
recognises the needs and the rights of the individual".
(GEAR Governing Committee, 1978* p* 2).
The "key issues’’document provided the basis for a consultation 
exercise; tenants' and residents' associations and voluntary 
organisations were contacted, a series of public meetings arranged 
and a survey of every household in the area undertaken by the SDA 
(SDA, 1978)* The SDA also set up ten working groups among the 
partners, one group on each of the key issues such as employment 
and housing, with the task to report on a strategy for each issue 
which would then be brought together by the SDA in an overall strategy. 
The resulting GEAR Strategy and Programme (SDA, 1980a, 1980b) 
contained six basic objectives:
1. To increase residents' competitiveness in 
securing employment;
2. To arrest economic decline and realise the 
potential of GEAR as a major employment centre;
3. To overcome the social disadvantages experienced 
by residents;
4. To improve and maintain the environment;
5# To stem population decline and engender a better 
balanced age and social structure; and
6. To foster residents' commitment and confidence.
(SDA, 1980a, p. 8).
Within each objective, the programme detailed the work undertaken 
since 1977 and committed for 1980-81 by each of the GEAR partici­
pants and programme targets to 1983* Although the Strategy and 
Programme was only approved by the Governing Committee in May 1980, 
it essentially represented a formalisation of what had been 
happening in GEAR since the beginning of the project.
The GEAR organisation allows each of the participants to 
retain full statutory powers and responsibilities and, from most 
accounts, the participants have proceeded on this basis rather than 
to seriously consider joint action. Of the £60 million spent on 
the GEAR project from 1977 to 1980, it is unclear how much of this 
and what programmes can be attributed to the existence of the 
project rather than to the normal activities of the participants 
(Donald and Hutton, 1980). However, two positive features of the 
initiative can be identified. First, the role of the SDA as a 
complement to the actions of the other authorities and bodies. The 
work of the SDA has centred on the problem of land renewal and in 
the case of the Cambuslang Recovery Area, the derelict site of a 
former iron works, tube works and power station, has shown its 
capability to handle large scale land assembly and site preparation 
even if its promotional efforts are only marginally successful in 
bringing the land back into commercial and industrial use. Most of 
the derelict land in the GEAR area, however, required consolidation 
of a pattern of fragmented private ownership and, unlike Liverpool 
and London Docklands, the behaviour of statutory undertakers has 
been a far smaller problem than that of the law relating to the 
acquisition and demolition of pigeon houses.
The second positive feature of GEAR has been its ability to 
inspire confidence in, and focus attention on, an area previously 
characterised by an air of hopelessness. How long this confidence 
will prevail, though, is a moot question. Despite the visible 
signs of action in the area, the four years of GEAR'S operation 
have seen unemployment increasing and Nelson (1980) suggests
public confidence in the project is not all it was made out to be. 
Perhaps the most telling comments on the GEAR initiative, however, 
are those made by the participating bodies. Interviews with 
officials involved in GEAR from the SDA and the Regional and 
District Councils revealed more cynicism than enthusiasm in an 
organisation which "has tended to inhibit action and promote 
discussion" (SDA Chief Executive quoted in Money, 1979* P« 10) and 
thereby failed to overcome the tendency for the individual partners 
to carry on in their individual ways. The view in the SDA now seems 
to be that, should another such venture be attempted, coordination 
should be based not on loose understandings of intent but on a 
contracting of real powers and responsibility to the machinery of 
coordination.
The Requirements of TJrban Regeneration
The three cases of Liverpool, London Docklands and the East 
End of Glasgow illustrate three different approaches to tackling 
the problem of urban regeneration, each of which, however, involved 
both tiers of local government, central government and other public 
bodies entering into voluntary partnerships of coordination. The 
different arrangements in each appear to largely reflect differences 
in the extent of the area across one or more local authorities, the 
particular institutions involved such as the SDA in Glasgow, and 
the different local government systems with their different 
divisions of functions between tiers; the Metropolitan County, 
Greater London and Scottish systems.
The particular problems in each area also differ in many 
respects and, because of this and the different administrative 
contexts, it is difficult to make a general assessment of the 
relative effectiveness of the three organisation arrangements for 
dealing with urban regeneration. However, it is possible to see 
two common elements in the problem of urban regeneration, in the 
strategies designed to tackle it and in the difficulties 
encountered in this area of urban policy.
The problem of urban regeneration in areas which have 
experienced decline in their economic bases and social and 
environmental conditions comprises two distinct problems: 
developing the new and improving, if not maintaining, the old.
With the widely acknowledged underlying importance of economic 
factors as the cause of urban decline, the two component problems 
of urban regeneration translate into two strands for policy 
attention:
1. The need to secure local economic development.
2. The need to tackle the problems of urban 
deprivation; housing, social services, 
transport, education and the physical 
environment.
The strategies adopted by the different policy-making organisations 
in the three cases examined all displayed a recognition of this 
two-fold nature of their task.
The important point about the two strands of urban regenera­
tion strategy is that, while clearly inter-related, one does not 
necessarily guarantee the other. For example, attention to
improving and supporting the existing physical and social conditions 
may enhance the area’s attraction to incoming investment hut does 
not ensure economic development. Efforts at securing economic 
development, on the other hand, which increases employment in the 
area may serve only to encourage commuting or moving into the area 
of new people rather than provide employment for those in greatest 
need. The balance to be struck between the two emphases of urban 
regeneration poses a dilemma for policy makers and it is for 
management of this dilemma that the machineries of administrative 
partnership and coordination have been designed. First, there has 
been an attempt to bring together all the authorities and agencies 
involved in promoting economic development and in tackling urban 
deprivation. Second, coordinating bodies have been set up to 
determine the nature of the balance between the competing demands 
within the overall strategy.
When the different roles of the administrative arrangements 
for urban regeneration have been distinguished, it is possible to 
detect differences in the potential between the three cases. On 
the issue of promoting economic development, the SDA and the DDO 
appear fax more suited than does the fragmented approach in Liverpool, 
although the Scotland-wide remit of the SDA may compromise its 
performance in GEAR compared to the exclusive Docklands function of 
the DDO. With regard to strategies to tackle urban deprivation, 
the design of the GEAR project and the bodies involved seems to 
offer the greatest prospects for formulating a concerted strategy.
The success of these two roles, however, is dependent upon the 
performance of the instruments of coordination and, in each case,
coordination is undertaken by a body which operates with no real 
power of its own but on the basis of willpower* The willingness of 
the various bodies to work together appears to be greater within 
the DJC structure than within the inner city partnerships, in both 
Liverpool and London Docklands, and within GEAR.
The main problems which have confronted strategies of urban 
regeneration in all three cases have, however, come from the state 
of the national economy and the corresponding macro-economic 
policies adopted by government. The promotion of economic develop­
ment has become increasingly difficult as the recession has proceeded 
through the 1970s and different areas of Britain have competed more 
intensively for the much reduced level of industrial and commercial 
investment. Strategies to relieve urban deprivation have been 
severely constrained by the public expenditure cuts which both 
Labour and Conservative Governments have applied since the early 
1970s. Accordingly, the dilemma between the two strands of urban 
regeneration strategy has been sharpened as the authorities have 
been faced with only marginal success on both fronts.
In such difficult conditions, the problem of extensive areas 
of derelict land which characterises the three areas appears to be 
of secondary importance. However, the land is seen as an opportunity 
to further both arms of the urban regeneration strategy by allowing 
development designed to supplement the local economic bases and to 
redress the imbalance in the provision of social facilities in the 
areas. The crucial problem in returning derelict land to use has 
been identified as the difficulties local authorities have with 
statutory undertakers in agreeing on the conditions and need for 
disposal of the land.
From an * assessment of the problems of London Docklands and 
the Merseyside Dock Area, Michael Heseltine concluded that a new 
form of organisation was required (and the proposal was later 
extended to GEAR):
”... there is a need for a single minded determination 
not possible for the local authorities concerned with 
their much broader responsibilities, ... To meet the 
challenge before us I am proposing to take general 
powers to enable me to set up Urban Development 
Corporations11.
(Heseltine, 1979b, p. 3)*
CHAPTER 3
URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 
Origins of the Concept
The practical adoption of UDCs emerged from the review of 
inner city partnerships but the idea has a longer history. When, 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the emphasis of British urban 
policy shifted from dispersal to new and expanding towns toward a 
more direct concern for the older urban areas, there was a corres­
ponding belief in some places that the organisation structures 
which had proved so successful with the new towns could be equally 
applied to the inner city context. How widely held was this belief 
is unknown, though there was much talk of "new towns in town".
Even if the structures could not be reproduced perhaps the ideas 
about planning and development could be; the transfer to the GEAR 
project of many staff from the abandoned Stonehouse NTDC has been 
seen by some as having contributed to a delay in GEAR coming to 
terms with the nature of the problems it faced.
The 1973 Travers Morgan proposals for London’s Docklands had 
envisaged different forms of new towns in the area and suggested an 
implementing agency which would work within a broad plan accepted 
by central and local government, progressively completing develop­
ment in various parts of the area before returning the development 
to the relevant local authority. Despite the lack of support for 
the Travers Morgan proposals, during the negotiations which led 
to establishment of the DJC, the Conservative Secretary of State, 
Geoffrey Rippon, suggested to the GLC and the Dockland Boroughs
that "a special agency of the new town type", with its ability to 
transcend competitive local priorities and to link planning closely 
with implementation, should be responsible for the massive task of 
Docklands redevelopment. The local authorities disagreed:
"It was felt very strongly that local government 
should be, and was, big enough and competent enough 
to undertake this responsibility and that to hive 
it off and place into the hands of an ad hoc body 
which was not publicly accountable to the local 
electorates would be both derogatory and dangerous 
to the future of London local govemment,,.
(House of Commons Paper, No. 348* 1974-75* P* 4)*
The DJC was established, with the Secretary of State agreeing 
that a statutory joint committee offered the best immediate prospect 
for redevelopment and accepting that, if the DJC did prove oompetent, 
there would be no question of a special agency created by legislation 
(Hansard. House of Commons, 30 November 1975* Col. 233)* However, 
when the Environment Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee took 
evidence and reported on "Redevelopment of the London Docklands" 
in early 1975 (House of Commons Paper No. 348, 1974-75)* a major 
part of its brief was consideration of the organisation structure.
The report and minutes of evidence document the first serious attempt 
to assess the arguments for and against the application of an 
organisation developed for the new town context to that of inner 
area problems.
The questioning by the Environment Sub-Committee referred to 
an agency on the lines of a new town development corporation (NTDC) 
as an alternative to the DJC, although several variations were
suggested by witnesses involving different powers and degrees of 
local representation. None of the alternative ideas, however, were 
highly developed —  for example, a "new town commission type of 
thing" was favoured by the former Conservative Secretary of State, 
Peter Walker (p. 113) —  and the Sub-Committee reported with reference 
to the NTDC model rather than to any variation. The Sub-Committee 
found support for and opposition to a development corporation in 
Docklands equally widespread but concluded:
"...recognising the Joint Committee has been in 
existence for over a year and noting the strength 
of feeling against the idea of a Development Cor­
poration ... the Joint Committee should continue 
as the responsible authority, at any rate for the 
present", (p. xiv).
"New towns in town" were again considered during preparation 
of the 1977 Policy for the Inner Cities White Paper but were rejected 
in favour of the partnership arrangements:
"...the local authorities were the natural agencies 
to tackle inner area problems; ...they were account­
able to local communities involved, ...they were 
best equipped, both in practical experience and in 
local sensitivities to deal with the problems and 
to reflect the wishes of the local people. And of 
course the inner city areas have, unlike the green­
field, sparsely inhabited areas developed by most 
New Town Corporations, substantial existing popula­
tions" •
(Shore, 1980, p. 2).
Still, a belief that inner city problems can be handled in a 
similar way to those of developing a new town has persisted despite 
a countervailing belief that they cannot:
"Planning policies for inner cities are inherently 
much more difficult to forge and operate than those 
which have been established for new towns".
(Cullingworth, 1976, p. 214).
A good example of "new towns in town" thinking and the 
emotions it involves was given in a statement made by Fred Roche, 
the then General Manager of the Milton Keynes Development Corpora­
tion, upon his refusal of an invitation to become managing director 
of the Docklands Development Organisation:
"Docklands, like Milton Keynes, is one of the 
most exciting and challenging urban building oppor­
tunities in the world, and could be an equally 
dramatic success....
What I find so sad, and indeed ironical, is that 
whilst this country had led the world in creating 
effeotive legislation in the form of the New Towns 
Act to carry out projects of this nature, a model 
which countries all over the world are now following, 
we in Britain are allowing our cities to deteriorate 
because, I suggest, we will not grasp the nettle and 
change legislation effectively to carry out projects 
such as Docklands".
(Quoted in Planning, 19 May 1978)*
A second contributory strand of thinking to ideas about new 
organisations for urban regeneration has come from regional policy 
in the form of the development board and development agency concepts. 
The concept of development boards, as instruments for channelling 
public investment, was conceived in the context of national 
economic planning and such institutions as the National Enterprise 
Board and, despite the lack of success with such policy in the 
1960s, the ideas have continued to hold a wide audience:
"Development powers cannot continue to remain with the 
private property industry because property and building 
companies establish their priorities on the basis of 
profitability not social necessity. Even if a private 
company were prepared to make a financial sacrifice 
it is impossible to imagine that private finance could 
be found for it. Thus public subsidies would be necessary 
in any case. It is, therefore, much more sensible to spend 
public money in a planned and accountable way by establishing 
public development coporations controlled from central 
government, but perhaps orgnaised on a regional basis. Again, 
the new towns have experimented with public corporations 
and though they have not always been as democratic and 
enlightened as they should have been, the potential is 
obvious."
(Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975* P* 165)•
The principles and origins of the development agency concept 
have been discussed by Gee (1981). A development agency differs 
from a development board in that it is designed as an instrument 
to channel private, rather than public, investment. Following the 
establishment of the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies in 
1975* Merseyside County Council unsuccessfully floated the idea 
of a Merseyside Development Agency; a single authority, akin to 
the Scottish and Welsh examples, to deal with the economic problems 
of Merseyside by promoting industry, and by funding and coordinating 
land reclamation and development. Thinking on the role of develop­
ment agencies in an urban context has been further stimulated by 
the experience of the SDA in GEAR.
In January and February 1979 the Environment Sub-Committee 
again examined the redevelopment of London Docklands and, again, 
paid particular attention to the question of organisation structure. 
Much of the evidence was a reiteration of that presented four years 
previously although there now appeared two points of reference for 
considering alternatives; the NTDCs and the "experimental developments
taking place in Glasgow" (House of Commons Paper, No. 99(i), 
1978-79, p. 11).
Three months later, the government changed, Michael Heseltine 
conducted his review of inner city policy and, from an increasing 
variety of possible organisational alternatives, selected the 
new town strain as the basis for UDCs.
Powers and Constitution
(i) The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980
The powers and specifications of a TJDC are given in the 
enabling legislation, that is, Part XVI and Schedules 26, 27 and 
28 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. The 
Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the Bill summarised the 
provisions:
"Part XVI provides for the creation of new corporations 
to regenerate urban areas. The powers of such corpora­
tions are to be modelled upon those of the new town 
development corporations, and the provisions will allow 
them to be given powers of land assembly, planning, 
housing and industrial promotion. Each corporation 
will be established by order which will specify the 
powers granted and designate the area in which they 
are exercisable. These powers may include functions 
of housing authorities and development control 
functions of local planning authorities", (p. iv).
A TJDC can, therefore, be vested with broad powers although "health, 
social services, education, emergency services, manpower services, 
refuse collection, etc should remain with the existing agencies"
(DoE, 1979, p. 2).
A TJDC may use these powers to:
"(a) acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose of 
land and other property;
(b) carry out building and other operations;
(c) seek to ensure the provision of water, electricity, 
gas, sewerage and other services;
(d) carry on any business or undertaking for the 
purposes of the object; and
(e) generally do anything necessary or expedient for 
the purposes of the object or for purposes 
incidental to those purposes." (Section 136, 3).
the object being "to .secure the regeneration of its area".
Unlike the normal exercising of local authority functions, 
where the authority lies primarily in elected councillors 
accountable to the local electorate, the operations of a TJDC will 
be governed by a body directly accountable to the Secretary of 
State. Schedule 26 of the Act specifies that a TJDC will consist 
of a chairman, a deputy chairman and up to eleven other members, 
and that the members will be appointed by the Secretary of State, 
although "in appointing members of the corporation, the Secretary 
of State shall have regard to the desirability of securing the 
services of people having special knowledge of the locality".
Within the generality of powers which may be conferred upon 
a TJDC, those relating to land and planning deserve elaboration.
All local authority owned land and any non-operational land owned 
by statutory undertakers in the urban development area (UDA) can 
be vested in the UDC through a Parliamentary Order promoted by 
the Secretary of State (and the appropriate Minister in the case 
of a statutory undertaker’s land). Furthermore, a TJDC can acquire 
through compulsory purchase order procedures: any other land in
the TJDA, "land adjacent to the area which the corporation requires 
for purposes connected with the discharge of the corporation’s 
functions in the area", and "land, whether or not in or adjacent 
to the area, which the corporation requires for the provision of 
services in connection with the discharge of the corporation's 
functions in the area." (Section 142).
A UDC can then dispose of this land in such a manner "as it 
considers expedient for securing the regeneration of the corpora­
tion's area or for purposes connected with the regeneration of 
the area" (Section 146, 1). The powers which can he granted to 
a TJDC allow it to proceed in its operations without regard for 
existing statutory plans or, even, to become the local planning 
authority. Moreover, there are no requirements in the Act for 
public consultation during the preparation of any such plans by 
a TJDC.
The crucial power in the enabling legislation, however, is 
the power for the Secretary of State to set up TJDC s. Unlike the 
new towns legislation which allows for a public inquiry into the 
designation, there is no such provision for UDCs. All that is 
required for the Secretary of State to establish a TJDC and 
designate a corresponding TJDA is the affirmative resolution by 
both Houses of Parliament of a statutory instrument.
(ii) Designation Orders
Orders to designate the London Docklands Development 
Corporation (LDDC), the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) 
and their corresponding areas were laid before Parliament on 
27 November 1980; the Glasgow suggestion had been withdrawn in
May. The two Orders further specified that each UDC would have 
the full complement of eleven members other than the chairman 
and deputy chairman.
The London Docklands Development Corporation (Area and 
Constitution) Order 1980 defined the proposed UDA (Figure 3*1)*
It is based on the DJC area but with certain amendments "to 
concentrate on areas with more immediate development prospects" 
(King, 1980, p. 3)* Those parts of the DJC area within Greenwich 
and Lewisham and the section eastward of the proposed East London 
River Crossing in Newham were excluded. Additions to the DJC area 
were sites around Tower Bridge including the completed hotel/ 
conference centre/marina development in St. Katharine’s Dock and 
the Hay's Wharf site where a controversial public inquiry into 
a major office development proposal was about to get under way.
The Merseyside UDA, as defined in the Merseyside Development 
Corporation (Area and Constitution) Order 1980 consists of three 
separate areas totalling 863 acres of which 60% is owned by the 
MDHC (Figure 3*2). In the City of Liverpool, the UDA includes 
all the South Docks which are mostly disused, and, in Wirral, an 
area of "underused" dockland also owned by the MDHC. The third 
area, in Sefton District, comprises land adjoining the operational 
North Docks which is mainly vacant but also includes a council 
housing estate.
Apart from defining the UDAs and designating the UDCs, however, 
the two Orders give no indication of the particular powers which 




Y v - f f A  \
\ \  c- i- r-t-/-« K i I^ A, i#' i \ r <% P F T O  N  / 'L/ft ; A ,;i::,‘- ^ d
.. - /.:^ ' M W £ % *
DISTRICT /
F.’ .>.. ■>- J ’ 1 L '-$> n \ . ..-''7, ■ , li c : 7 .Tr&Xvt % 'rv
7 -■ ^ . - i .  .'. r f  j  -- \  .- • . .T ;-., ' y y  , f  i - v \
a-i-V-r. • \ Y. Afv * "~A'l .O'"'* ~
CORPORATION :/A -T K .itk d





A . - i f  4:4
/! 6 jf-g- _.
L o c k  t f  1mm
SrffTS^ ie
4 , V) <vy-t
A \
■ m m L I V E R P O O L  DISTRIC
k ■.' .
v A > - . \ !  ? ; ?  f f .  ' ■ • -  ;  . ; . •■ *  :•  A \ W
V I r  '-5 ‘ . ‘ '■-T . \  •„•• •, , •', . - { ■  ' t A-- - - , ,  V
: ■/•fi'Vv* :v •; f • ’v T\ \
\ ,
V
WI R R AL
>' A" V-7 feju.-;?2>\ Lucks
DISTRICT
*'?'"••. • ''\fv  i'.'V f ' - ;';:,‘v■>• • Y ^ .' c ----- -"'-I-*
' • . 4  ‘
-
© Crown copyright 1SS0
Based on the Ordnance Survey map
2 Kms
1 Miles
' A  N^Onei spool Si ’•o t'cl ; H a x  W. ' ,v - 
"xfi \\ \
DESIGNATED AREA
LOCAL AUTHORITY BOUNDARY 
Source *.
Indications of Intent
Michael Heseltine had launched the TJDC proposals with the 
assertion that the then current policies paid insufficient heed 
to private sector needs:
"There must be a place for individual initiative and 
enterprise to get on the move, and for the voluntary 
sector to make its own effective contribution.
Government can help create the right climate: by
creating opportunities which others can take up, for 
example, by reclaiming land to encourage private 
development, improving the environment so that there 
is a demand for homes, encouraging the voluntary 
sector to build up a self reliant community”.
(Heseltine, 1979b, p. 1).
The appointments of shadow chairmen to the TJDCs made by Michael 
Heseltine in February 1930 fitted the bill. The head of the 
shadow LDDC was announced as Nigel Broackes, the Chairman of 
Trafalgar House Ltd, the massive transport, publishing and 
engineering corporation, and on Merseyside the post went to 
Leslie Young, Chairman of the agricultural and industrial group,
J. Bibby and Sons, Chairman of the North West Industrial Develop­
ment Board and a Director of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company. 
With two prominent businessmen as shadow chairmen, Heseltine then 
appointed prominent local politicians as shadow deputy chairmen: 
the Labour MP for Bermondsey, Bob Mellish, in London, and the 
Leader of the Merseyside County Council, Sir Kenneth Thompson, 
on Merseyside.
All four appointees to the controversial posts made cautious 
and defensive statements, stressing the role local authorities
would retain in the area (quoted in Planning, 15 February 1980), 
and Nigel Broackes later delivered a major speech to the Royal 
Town Planning Institute (Broackes, 1980) in which he presented the 
proposed UDC as far less draconian than its powers suggested. The 
TJDC would use compulsory purchase powers only as a last resort, 
would act as a landlord only when unavoidable, would operate as a 
developer as infrequently as possible, would review and supplement 
rather than replace existing plans, and would respect local interests. 
So why a UDC then and what would it do? Broackes argued that the 
local authorities had taken regeneration of London Docklands to 
the stage "where a single-minded, non-political authority can 
take over to cause the work to be carried out" (p. 5) he saw 
the role of the TJDC as providing some infrastructure and development 
on its own account, but mainly to create an atmosphere of long-term 
confidence to encourage wider investment in Docklands by industrial­
ists, financial institutions, house builders and other developers.
Shadow Chief Executives were appointed in May: Reginald Ward
in London and Ronald Turton on Merseyside. Both had previously 
worked in local government and in NTDC s. Three weeks later, 
however, Turton declined the post supposedly because "he was 
unhappy with the terms and conditions offered" (Planning, 23 May 
1980). He was replaced shortly after by Basil Bean, the General 
Manager of Northampton Development Corporation. "I am obviously 
excited by the challenge of regenerating an area of immense 
potential right alongside the centre of the world's greatest city", 
said Reg Ward on his appointment, while Basil Bean was looking 
forward to "cooperating with the local and public authorities in
the area which are very much involved in the task” (Planning,
9 May and 13 June 1980). There still appeared to he little idea 
of the nature of the task and how the TJDCs would operate.
In April, the DoE had commissioned Coopers and Lybrand 
Associates Ltd to carry out an economic potential study of London 
Docklands for the proposed UDC. The broad terms of reference 
included:
"form a clear picture of economic and social life 
in Docklands, and of its current and potential 
role in the wider Metropolitan area;
analyse the chief factors that have held back 
development of Docklands in the past, what have 
been their underlying causes, and what must be 
done to minimise their influence in the future;
specify the framework in which future develop­
ment of Docklands should proceed; and
help define realistic development objectives, 
both short and long term for the new Corporation".
though the emphasis was on:
- "identify the general conditions necessary to
instil new confidence in the development 
potential of the area, particularly on the part 
of the financial institutions;
- undertake an imaginative review of the potential 
development opportunities, identifying the most 
promising possibilities and indicating where 
these might be located;
- identify the critical constraints to successful 
implementation of the most promising opportuni­
ties, and what must be done to overcome them".
(Coopers and Lybrand Associates Ltd, 1980a).
Similarly, Roger Tym and Partners Consortium were commissioned to
62.
provide for the shadow Merseyside UDC:
”... a project framework, a programme of land 
acquisition and reclamation, and proposals for 
implementation, timing and costs. These proposals 
should be placed in a budget framework and include 
targets, and should be set against an appraisal of 
the current economic situation in Merseyside”.
(Roger Tym and Partners Consortium, 1980, p. 1).
The London and Liverpool consultants reported in June and October 
1980, respectively, although the reports were to remain internal 
until each UDC was officially designated.
As the enabling legislation was passed and the Designation 
Orders laid before Parliament, the Government issued further 
statements of its intentions for the operation of UDCs. The UDCs 
would be granted access to all the general powers available, 
although it was not intended that they should become local housing 
authorities or exercise building control functions and the UDCs 
would be vested with the powers of a local planning authority 
except for plan-making purposes. A special development order would 
be made giving, by virtue, planning permission to the UDC's approved 
proposals (DoE, 1980; King, 1980). With regard to the London UDC:
"The Government considers that so far as is possible, 
the Corporation should secure the regeneration of the 
Docklands UDA by engaging the funds and energies of 
the private sector. It is recognised that at the 
outset the Corporation itself may have to undertake 
commercial and industrial development on its own 
account; but it is expected to make sufficient progress 
early on for it not to have to undertake on its own 
account commercial and industrial development after 
the first three years of life".
(DoE, 1980, p. 3)
Despite their basis on NTDCs, the shape being taken by the 
shadow UDCs was somewhat different. Instead of teams of in-house 
professionals, the UDCs intended to rely heavily on the use of 
external skills, especially from the private sector though also 
from the local authorities. In the London case at least; "The 
principals of such firms who are directly involved will be 
encouraged to operate as members of the internal management team, 
and their key staff integrated into the organisations unique 
partnership between a public agency and the private sector" (Ward, 
1980). The staff numbers of the corporations will be kept as low 
as possible and will revolve around a few key positions. The LDDC 
will have an Executive Group of the Chief Executive and two others; 
a Chief Development Surveyor and a Chief Architect and Planner.
The corresponding positions in the MDC are a Director of Development 
and a Commercial Director.
The text of the shadow LDDC!s advertisement for the two senior 
staff positions provided a good indication of the style of opera^ - 
tion it intended to adopt (though it should be noted that the 
affairs of the embryonic MDC have been conducted in a far less 
brazen and relatively low key manner):
"THE RENAISSANCE OP LONDON DOCKLANDS 
• • •
To realise this opportunity of Urban Renaissance 
on such an unprecedented scale - to implement schemes 
and projects of genuine vision - requires the skills 
of two exceptional professionals.
Chief Architect and Planner
A conceptual planner and designer of the very 
highest originality and reputation, capable of
harnessing all the best design practices in Europe 
into a working partnership to match this challenge.
Chief Development Surveyor
An implementor with an oustanding track record 
of achievement in the construction field coupled 
with an ability to mobilise the Property Industry 
to create this great *New London*•
Alongside the Chief Executive Designate, these 
two appointments will form a team to direct and 
inspire a small and dynamic organisation of refined 
skills in a closely-knit partnership with the private 
sector."
(Sunday Times, 19 October 1980).
The Government and members and staff of the shadow TJDCs have 
given repeated assurances that the TJDCs will work closely with 
the local authorities though the specific working arrangements 
have not been specified. Members of the Corporations, besides 
the chairmen and deputy chairmen and the chief executive, have 
not yet been announced though are apparently the subject of intense 
speculation. Furthermore, it is still unclear how the Urban 
Programme will be administered in UDAs. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to represent the essential structure of the UDC approach 
to urban regeneration (Figure 3«3) for comparison with Figures 
2.2, 2.4 and 2.5* It appears that UDCs will both complement and 
supplant, rather than replace the entirety of, organisation 
structures in their areas. It remains to be seen whether such a 
structure, with its adopted emphases, is likely to handle the 
problems and dilemma of urban regeneration (and so achieve the 
stated object of a UDC) better than the previous organisations.
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.4 Efficiency, Effectiveness and Accountability
Many of the pronouncements on UDCs have been conducted in 
general terms about the relative merits of "efficiency” and "local 
democracy". "Efficiency", however, is a meaningless term unless 
one specifies about what one is being efficient (Pay, 1975) and 
the dangers of appealing to the much abused concept of "democracy" 
are illustrated by the way in which opposing sides in the argument 
both evoke the term or its antithesis:
- The Leader of Tower Hamlets Borough Council:
"This is the closest to total dictatorship any
British Government has ever come..."
(London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1980a, p. 4)*
- Michael Heseltine:
"Democracy as a system of government I will
defend against all comers".
(Heseltine, 1979a, p. 27).
To determine the meaning of UDCs with respect to their object it 
is necessary to look at the objective results which are likely to 
stem from a "unique partnership with the private sector", from 
disenfranchising certain people with respect to certain functions 
of local government and from removing statutory rights to public 
consultation over planning.
Undoubtedly, a UDC will have the potential for a high degree 
of entrepreneurial efficiency; that is, the ability to bring land 
into use, through the concentration of its powers of land acquisition, 
planning, economic promotion and implementation if need be. A UDC,
it is suggested, will speed up the process of planning, land assembly 
and disposal, infrastructure provision and industrial and commercial 
development. Besides the fragmentation of powers in the previous 
organisation structures, although in London Docklands an attempt 
had been made to overcome this through the DDO, the TJDC proposals 
were supported by the argument that possible commercial and industrial 
developments were being delayed or foresaken by competition between 
the local authorities. Competition for development was apparent 
in London Docklands, with Tower Hamlets at a distinct advantage 
because of its proximity to the City, but, with development so 
scarce, the DJC could not afford to risk any possibility in the 
interests of balanced development throughout its area. The pattern 
of new private developments in Docklands seemed to reflect market 
forces rather than regulatory planning. The difference in entre- 
peneurial efficiency which a UDC might achieve may have been over­
estimated. Nevertheless, the design of UDCs —  their structure, 
powers, personnel and emphases —  has been geared primarily toward 
commercial and industrial development.
The necessary qualification to a statement of entrepreneurial 
efficiency is consideration of how effective any secured developments 
will be in meeting the object of the UDC. The kinds of development 
which Reginald Ward hopes to attract initially to the London UDA 
include:
"... 'two or three large industrial developments', as 
well as 'marina hotel complexes with related industry, 
science parks and recreational facilities' ... There are 
some superb sites for office development too, close to 
the City and with views up and down the river to Tower 
Bridge and Greenwich".
(Taylor, 1981, p. 656).
The extent to which such developments would directly or indirectly 
contribute to relieving unemployment in the area is doubtful. 
Attracting large scale industrial developments will probably take 
the form experienced by the DJC where establishment of the News 
International newspaper printing works in Tower Hamlets, for 
example, is the result of a move out of the City by both the plant 
and its employment. A second "Docklands success", the move of the 
Billingsgate Pish Market to the Isle of Dogs, is similarly limited 
in its impact on the problems of Docklands.
The DJC had in 1978 expressed grave reservations about the 
value of office developments in Docklands:
"The future economy of East London cannot be left to 
be decided by the current trends of declining industry 
and growth in office based services. Any expectation 
that the latter will compensate for the former must 
be very uncertain".
(DJC, 1976, p. 16).
The employment requirements of office developments, given 
realisation of the demand for office space which the current 
speculative boom in London assumes, do not match the skill 
characteristics of the unemployed in Docklands. Likewise, the 
service developments which Ward envisages are not those which are 
most desperately needed by, let alone accessible to, the established 
people of Docklands and will therefore not help redress the 
difficulties in the provision of services which public expenditure 
cuts have caused.
Policies of land development, if they are to be effective in 
tackling urban regeneration, must be related to social and employment
objectives as well as to economic development. To achieve this 
relation, the operations of the 'single-minded' land development 
body must be linked to those of authorities with broader concerns 
and must take heed of the needs of the people in the area. It is 
this aspect which appears to have been seriously neglected in the 
case of UDCs.
The UDCs will be accountable to the Secretary of State, not 
to the elected representatives of the area in which the UDC will 
operate. The inner city partnerships represented a recognition of 
the need for direct central government involvement but also of the 
importance of local authorities in urban regeneration. To draw 
the lines of accountability exclusively to central government is to 
make the tenuous assumption that the priorities of central and local 
government coincide. The assurances that the UDCs will consult and 
work closely with local authorities and the public have deservedly 
attracted scepticism. Any local authority members appointed to the 
UDC boards would be there as directors of the UDC rather than as 
representatives of their authorities. In September 1980 Reg Ward 
told the Docklands Forum that he would like to see its retention —  
as a "resource distribution centre" — - and he later outlined the 
shadow LDDC's "enlightened" proposals for public consultation:
"The LDDC will aim to involve community groups and 
local authorities in early discussions on new proposals 
for the area, rather than rely on the formal consulta­
tion process. 'I find that a far more satisfactory 
way of working than having a series of set pieces 
whereby one produces a document or a set of plans, 
which obviously constrain the outcome in many ways' •"
(Taylor, 1981, p. 656).
Such informal relations between a UDC and local authorities and 
the public amount to possible information channels not to any power 
which accountability necessarily entails.
A second point regarding the limited accountability of UDCs 
concerns the limitations of area approaches to urban regeneration.
In both London Docklands and on Merseyside, it had been felt 
necessary, and an opportunity, to consider regeneration of the 
extensive dock areas with respect to the broader urban area.
Although the docks in Liverpool have never been regarded as an 
integral part of the city, being walled off and largely inaccessible, 
one of the main attractions of their potential redevelopment has 
been the possibility of thereby relieving the problems of adjacent 
urban areas. A corresponding belief was espoused in the London 
Docklands Strategic Plan:
"... Docklands cannot in any respect be treated as 
an island unto itself. The development must blend 
into the surrounding urban areas physically, 
socially and economically ..."
(DJC, 1976, P. 14).
Where the DJC and Liverpool Inner City Partnership structures 
allowed policies to be formulated with consideration of the wider 
urban context, the UDC structure makes no provision.
In all, the UDC approach to urban regeneration appears to 
show a complete unawareness of the nature of the task as revealed 
by the experiences in Liverpool, London Docklands and the East 
End of Glasgow. UDCs are focussed on just one strand of the 
requirements of urban regeneration, fail to make the distinction
between efficiency and effectiveness within this strand, and, further, 
ignore the dilemma of urban regeneration. UDCs are directed at local 
economic development with consideration of neither the employment 
implications nor the other problems of urban deprivation. To 
believe that a UDC can "secure the regeneration of its area" is to 
make unrealistic assumptions about the relationship between 
economic development and employment development, about the ability 
of the private sector to compensate for inadequate public sector 
developments and services and, generally, to confuse the making 
of quick decisions with the identification of solutions.
The strength of UDCs lies in their potential to relate 
closely with the private sector and, with respect to extensive 
derelict land, to link acquisition, assembly, planning, promotion 
and development. Both these aspects of urban regeneration strategy 
had been less developed in previous approaches. Incorporated in 
UDCs, however, these advantages look likely to be outweighed by 
the disadvantages. UDCs, though, are only one variant from the 
thinking on organisations for urban regeneration and might not 
some other alternative allow the marrying of the advantages of a 
UDC with the other requirements of urban regeneration?
The Best Alternative?
In face of the UDC proposal, several alternative institutions 
have been suggested; devised particularly with respect to the 
London Docklands context. The arguments for an "Industrial 
Development Board" which had been put forward by the trade unions 
and JDAG for several years were revived (JDAG, 1979b; TGWU, 1980;
TTJG, 1980). In this recognition of weaknesses in the DJC structure, 
it was suggested that a Board be set up with special powers to buy 
land and promote and undertake development. The Board would 
comprise representatives of employers, trade unions, statutory 
undertakers and community interests and "would work within the 
framework set by the local planning authorities ... Its task would 
be to encourage industrial investment from both public and private 
sectors" (TGWU, 1980, p. 2). This approach, it was argued, would 
allow "both the comprehensive planning of public and private 
investment and the continuing sensitivity of development to local 
needs and circumstances" (TUC, 1980, p. 9)*
Peter Shore (1980) has suggested that a UDC should only be 
established with the agreement of the principal local authorities 
in the area —  thereby, giving his tacit support to the Merseyside 
UDC. Otherwise, "an alternative that deserves consideration is 
and ’Industrial and Commercial Development Agency1" (1980, p. 25).
He was no more specific than to say that such an agency would have 
funds and powers of its own but would act within an established 
plan and would be responsible to an existing inner city partnership 
committee.
In a contribution to the debates on an electoral manifesto for 
the London Labour Party in the forthcoming local government 
elections, a group of Fabians have proposed establishment of a 
"London Development Agency" (Hall, 1980). The Agency would be 
run by a Board drawn from the GLC and London Boroughs and would 
enter into partnerships with boroughs and private agencies to 
develop individual sites. The main object of the Agency would be 
to deal with the problems of wasteland in the city:
"Here a body is needed that can operate with the 
flexibility, resources and time span of a New Town 
Development Corporation, but with local project 
committees, and implementing planning policies 
that have already been approved.”
(Hall, 1980, p. 5).
Coupled with a "London Enterprise Board", the group saw the two 
new agencies as capable of playing the role of the SDA and WDA. 
Furthermore, for the particular problems of extreme dereliction 
in Docklands, it was suggested "the local authorities could work 
through local development agencies, with delegated powers and 
resources, under the umbrella of the London Development Agency" 
(Hall, 1980, p. 7)* The Greater London Regional Council of the 
Labour Party (1980) subsequently adopted the recommendation for 
a "Greater London Enterprise Board" with a Docklands division in 
its draft manifesto for the GLC elections (GLRCLP, 1980, p. 33)* 
The above suggestions all seem to offer, on first glance at 
least, practical and superior alternatives to UDCs. The most 
obvious and immediate alternative to a UDC, however, is GEAR. 
After all, the Government did make and then withdraw a proposal 
to replace GEAR with a UDC.
When the UDC proposals were announced in September1979* 
although GEAR was not mentioned, the intended legislation applied 
to Scotland and the local authority participants anticipated 
application of the UDC proposal to GEAR. The SDD was showing an 
interest in the proposal and both Glasgow District Council and 
Strathclyde Regional Council began studying the implications.
So, the local authorities were prepared when Malcolm Rifkind, the
responsible Scottish Office Minister, proposed to them at a 
meeting on 17 December that a UDC replace GEAR*
GEAR at that stage was passing through a hiatus as unemploy­
ment in the area increased, the effects of housing cuts began to 
appear and general commitment to the project was ebbing. The main 
concern of the 17 December meeting was the slow progress being made 
by GEAR. The Minister suggested that the slow progress was due to 
the administrative arrangements5 specifically, the situation in 
which the Governing Committee had responsibility but no executive 
powers —  a view shared by the SDA. From this analysis, Malcolm 
Rifkind suggested a UDC would be better. The local authorities, 
however, argued that delays were due to spending cuts and opposed 
the UDC suggestion. In face of this opposition, Rifkind proposed 
an alternative to establishing a UDC in which the Governing 
Committee would be equipped with executive powers and iira own 
budget and the administration would be streamlined. Meanwhile, 
the Scottish Office would work up the UDC proposal in greater 
detail.
The response of the GEAR partners was to institute two changes 
in the administrative arrangements. First, a Management Group was 
established as a third tier in the coordination machinery. The 
Management Group was delegated some authority from the Consultative 
Group of officials and given the task of day-to-day management, 
meeting monthly beginning on 16 April 1980 whereas the Consultative 
Group met only quarterly. Second, the partners agreed to give the 
SDA some power to influence their budgets through the procedure of 
declaring priorities and preparing annual programmes; effectively
formalising what had been happening anyway. These two minor 
changes seem to have placated the Minister who, at the Governing 
Committee meeting on 29 May 1980:
"... recalled that since the last meeting there had 
been discussion of the possibility of replacing the 
GEAR machinery with an TJDC but ... the Government 
was prepared not to pursue the proposal because of 
the objections of the Regional and District Councils 
and because, given the stage the project had already 
reached, it might prejudice the progress which was 
being made under the existing arrangements".
(Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the GEAR Governing 
Committee, 29 May 1980).
If such arguments were applied to the London Docklands TJDC 
proposal with its vociferous opposition from local authorities 
and longer history of the DJC, that proposal would presumably be 
rejected in favour of a structure involving a development agency 
operating with the local authorities. That is, unless the real 
reason for withdrawal of the UDC for GEAR proposal was, as many 
suggest, the fact that Michael Heseltine's political clout does 
not extend to Scotland. Whatever the reason, the example of GEAR 
provides one more model which should have been considered by the 
Government as a favourable alternative to UDCs. It may be argued 
that the lead institutions for such a structure do not exist 
outside Scotland and Wales, but, if the Government was prepared to 
legislate for UDCs, surely it could legislate for less powerful 
bodies.
The evidence on the likely operations of UDCS and on possible 
alternatives raises doubts, but, still clinging to the possibility 
that UDC's are designed in the interests of their areas, it is 
neccessary to look further for their justification. How has the 
Government supported the proposal since its inception?.
CHAPTER 4
JUSTIFYING URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS
The Advent of Urban Development Corporations
The first public appearance of the UDC proposals was in the 
press statement on inner city policy presented by Michael Heseltine 
on 14 September 1979 (Heseltine, 1979b). The statement revealed 
that UDCs would be modelled on the NTDCs, would be set up in the 
London Docklands and in the "Merseyside Dock Area", and that 
enabling legislation would be taken in the coming Parliamentary 
session. The review of inner cities policy had been conducted 
internally within the DoE and, beyond its existence, little was 
known of either the direction the review was taking or of the 
government’s intentions. By early September, the Financial Times 
(3rd September 1979) knew only enough to report that it was understood 
Heseltine had approached the Cabinet with proposals to change the 
status of the seven inner city partnership areas into New Town-style 
authorities. A week before the press statement, at a conference 
attended by Heseltine, the managing director of the Docklands 
Development Organisation (a body which a UDC would replace) was 
merrily detailing the DDO's operational programme for the coming 
years (Mawer, 1979)*
Reaction to the press statement was immediate. Simultaneously, 
press releases opposing the proposals were issued by the leaders 
of the Tower Hamlets and Southwark Councils who had, together with 
the other three Dockland Borough leaders, been privately notified 
by Heseltine of his intentions. The Conservative GLC leader, Horace 
Cutler, was concerned lest the new agency interfere with the GLC’s
strategic planning role and, in Liverpool: "Reaction... .was bitter
and swift. Sir Kenneth Thompson, Conservative Chairman of the 
Merseyside County Council, speaking also on behalf of the Labour 
and Liberal groups expressed 'surprise and shock'." (Observer,
16th September 1979)•
Under the British system of government (Birch, 1980, p. 183), 
"...it is the normal practice of government departments to consult 
representatives of affected interests before taking decisions". In 
this case, it seems such a principle of responsible government was 
not followed. There had been no public debate on the specific 
issues and possible solutions, no provision for consultation, no 
committee of inquiry; the investigations of the Environment Sub- 
Committee of the Expenditure Committee in 1975 and 1979 examined 
only Docklands and alternative organisations only in general terms. 
The policy decision appears to have been taken on the basis of a 
limited consideration of the arguments. In the words of the leader 
of the Tower Hamlets Borough Council:
"There was no consultation. The Government took office 
and announced the UDC. When the borough leaders were 
called up, we asked why they hadn't even bothered to 
talk to us about it as there were elements which could 
have been refined in the existing machinery, and the 
Minister said that 'I just knew you would disagree 
with me. I knew you wouldn't want what I want and so 
I am telling you this is not up for argument, this is 
what you are going to do'."
(Beasley, 1980, p. 28).
Still, UDCs at this stage were no more than proposals, albeit 
firm proposals. Before a UDC could be established, the enabling 
legislation had to be justified through the procedures of
parliamentary passage and a further Designation Order would have to 
be affirmed by both Houses. Clearly, a parliamentary majority can 
dictate the outcome but parliament is supposedly a place for the 
consideration of legislation, for debate and amendment. So, on 
what grounds, if any, did the Government dismiss the opposition to 
UDCs and so allow the proposals to emerge barely scathed from the 
parliamentary process?
MountingOpposition
A "Consultation Paper on UDCs" (DoE, 1979) followed and 
elaborated the press statement. Strangely, the opportunity for 
consultation came after the policy decision, yet the paper did 
purport to "...set out in more detail the issues involved so that 
it can form a basis for discussion with those affected" (DoE, 1979* 
p. 1). The tone of the paper, however, suggested a purpose not to 
question UDCs but rather to consider their implementation:
"The Department of the Environment intends to engage 
in discussions at official level with the local 
authorities concerned, before the introduction of 
legislation in the House. In particular, these 
discussions will need to cover the question of 
handling Urban Programme projects in areas to be 
designated for UDCs".
(DoE, 1979, p. 6).
Doubts about the genuineness of the desire for consultation 
were reinforced by the limited time available before the enabling 
legislation was introduced into Parliament, as a Part of the Local 
Government, Planning and Land B.71, on 3rd December 1979* Con­
sidering the time involved in preparation of a Bill —  proposing
the Bill in Cabinet, drafting, Cabinet approval of the draft Bill — , 
the TJDC provisions must have been written into the Bill, if not 
before, then shortly after issue of the consultation paper. However, 
when the Government introduced the Bill into the Lords, it was 
greeted by a storm of protest as it was considered a major piece of 
legislation which should first be introduced into the Commons. The 
Bill was hastily withdrawn and not reintroduced until late January; 
a fortuitous turn of events for those opposed to the TJDC proposals, 
allowing them longer to prepare their case before the parliamentary 
passage began.
It had soon become clear to opponents that the Consultation
Paper was not a potentially fruitful avenue for challenging the
proposals and opposition was geared toward resisting UDCs in 
*
parliament • Moreover, the Consultation Paper had revealed that 
there would be no public inquiry, as there is with new towns, 
associated with the laying of a designation order before parliament.
The Dockland Borough Councils had, within two weeks of the 
press statement, produced a report entitled Local Democracy Works.
A Partnership in London Docklands: The Case Against a New Town 
(Dockland Borough Councils, 1979)* The report attacked the principles 
behind UDCs, disputed the need for a TJDC in Docklands and argued 
that, instead of the supposed benefits, a TJDC would be detrimental 
to the people in the area —  the logic adopted by most of the
It is not known what direct response the Consultation Paper 
elicited. A request to the DoE for details drew the evasive 
reply: "...there was no officially published response..."
(Correspondence from DoE, 28th August 1980).
opponents. After failing to impress their views upon Heseltine, 
the borough councils were involved in arranging a series of local 
meetings to explain to people the implications of a UDC, took their 
case to the London Boroughs Association and then directed their 
opposition, through local M.P.'s and the Opposition Spokesman on 
the Environment, Roy Hattersley, to the Parliamentary Labour Party. 
After a meeting between the Borough leaders and Roy Hattersley on 
18th October, the Labour Party stated:
"Tory plans to set up an Urban Development Corporation 
to run London and Liverpool Docklands will be resisted 
by the Labour Party at every level".
(Labour Party Press Release, 18th October, 1979)*
The Docklands Forum passed a resolution against the UDC which 
was put to the DJC who condemned the lack of consultation but 
preferred to meet Heseltine before issuing a statement. A delega­
tion of six DJC members went to see the Minister and he made it 
clear he would not change his mind. The Chairman of the Forum 
wrote to Heseltine in February requesting that he receive a 
deputation from the Forum so that the voluntary sector and local 
organisations could put their views. Heseltine declined them the 
opportunity: "I have to say ... a meeting would not change my
views" (Correspondence from Heseltine to Chairman of the Docklands 
Forum, 2nd May 1980).
JDAG had produced by 18th September a "Draft Response to 
Proposals for an Urban Development Corporation for Docklands"
(JDAG, 1979a), followed by a press statement of their opposition 
and publication of a report, Docklands in Danger (JDAG, 1979b)•
A meeting was convened by JDAG on 13th November to consider possible 
joint action with other groups and with the borough councils. The 
meeting resolved that the:-
"Main task is to build a local campaign since not many 
organisations know the arguments for and against. A 
local base should be built, borough by borough, using 
leaflets, posters, petitions and public meetings.
Speakers should go to Trades Councils and other groups".
(JDAG, 1979o).
Accordingly, JDAG continued to issue press statements and leaflets, 
to publicise their case, to try and coordinate the opposition in 
the hope that it would be supported by the development of a series 
of local campaigns.
The union movement has had a long-standing active interest in 
the redevelopment of London's docklands; a TGV/U National Executive 
member sat on the DJC and an extensive exhibition, "London's Docks 
and Docklands" was mounted by the TUC in September 1980. Union 
opposition to UDCs was channelled throu^a a series of papers, state­
ments and resolutions from local trades councils and the TGWU to 
the TUC and the Labour Party organisation. The Greater London 
Regional Council of the Labour Party held a special conference on 
UDCs in February 1980 and another, in association with the South 
East Region TUC in May. The May meeting ended with the agreement 
of a platform for a campaign against UDCs ranging from action by 
local trade union branches and trades councils to that of the 
Labour Party (GLR Labour Party/SE Region TUC, 1980).
The voluntary sector, heavily dependent on Urban Programme 
funds and particularly concerned with pair tic ipation and consultation, 
was another early opponent of UDCs. The Southwark Council for
Voluntary Service and the Newham Voluntary Agencies Council both 
produced papers opposing a London UDC, the latter organised a 
petition throughout the Borough and requested the local M.P. take 
a stand on the issue in Parliament. On the other hand, the General- 
Secretary of the London Voluntary Service Council gave the proposal 
his.guarded support (Lomas, 1979)•
A Docklands UDC was also supported by the British Property 
Federation (Estates Times, 11 April 1980, p. 4)* "warmly welcomed" 
by the Chairman of Greater London Conservative M.P.s and, favoured 
with qualifications, by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(lcci, 1979).
The professional body of the Royal Town Planning Institute 
(RTPl) and the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) showed 
great interest in the proposals with the arrangement of conferences 
on UDCs and the preparation of responses to the Bill with which to 
lobby Parliament. The TCPA were generally opposed to the provisions 
in the Bill, although, since 1986, it has advocated some form of 
development agency for the inner cities. The RTPI appeared divided 
on the issue, with professional interests often seeming dominant 
over consideration of public interests in its debates.
Substantial opposition to UDCs, then, had been generated to 
encounter the proposed legislation, but mainly in London Docklands. 
On Merseyside, the proposed UDC had proved a "non issue" with only 
the Merseyside County Council voicing discontent. Any opposition 
to the Bill was forestalled by the Government, however, when the 
leader of the County Council, Sir Kenneth Thompson, accepted 
Michael Heseltine*s invitation to become shadow deputy chairman
of the Merseyside UDC in February. Similarly, the appointment of 
Bob Mellish to the corresponding position in London can be seen 
as an attempt to drive a wedge into a consolidated front of Labour 
Party opposition. Both politicians defended their apparent betrayal 
in similar ways:
Bob Mellish - "The objections of the local authorities
can be overcome by ensuring that they 
are represented on the Committee".
Sir Kenneth Thompson - "I believe the County Council could carry
out the necessary work ... but faced with 
the inevitability of the UDC's establish­
ment we must cooperate and work with it".
(Quoted in Planning, 15 February 1980).
Such statements, while partly self-fulfilling, reflect early doubts 
in the ability of the opposition to bear upon the Government's 
committed proposals.
,3 Parliamentary Passage
The heavily revised Bill, the Local Government, Planning and 
Land (No. 2) Bill, was reintroduced into the House of Commons on 
24 January 1980. Since its ill-fated introduction into
the Lords, Cabinet objections to the amount of parliamentary time 
which the Bill would have required had apparently caused the Bill 
to go to Cabinet twice, further delaying its introduction. Con­
servative Whips in Commons, however, now seemed confident that the 
danger of revolt among backbenchers had receded (Financial Times, 
January 1980, p. 3)* The new Bill contained 97 less sections but 
the UDC provisions had survived the redrafting intact.
The enabling legislation for UDCs was being sought within a Bill 
which also proposed tighter central government control over local 
government rating and capital spending programmes, reduced powers 
for county planning authorities and for strategic planning, the 
introduction of charges for planning applications and appeals, the 
repeal of the Community Land Act (1975) and, after the March 1980 
Budget announcement, provisions for the establishment of Enterprise 
Zones. Passage of the UDC sections was, therefore, set in a context 
of many other issues and, from the outset, consideration of UDCs 
was dependent upon competition with those other issues within the 
limits of parliamentary time allocated to the Bill. The first point 
made by the Opposition during the Second Reading Debate was to argue 
that the Bill was less a coherent piece of legislation than a number 
of disparate proposals each justifying a Bill of its own, and the 
collection of so many issues together made it very difficult to 
debate (Roy Hattersley, Hansard, 5 February 1980, Col. 258).
The passage of a Bill through Parliament involves a lengthy 
procedure in each House of a First Reading, Second Reading, Committee 
Stage, Report Stage and Third Reading. If this procedure is not 
completed by the end of the Parliamentary Session, then the Bill 
is "lost”. The First Reading of a Bill involves no debate but is 
simply the occasion on which the Bill is formally introduced.
M.P.s then have an opportunity to study the terms of the Bill 
before the "debating proper" begins. In the case of UDCs, M.P.s 
also had the opportunity to consider two petitions, lodged on 
behalf of the Boroughs of Southwark and Tower Hamlets, which 
condensed the Boroughs1 arguments against the proposals (Hansard,
25 January 1980, Cols. 795-96).
In the Second Reading Debate the main principles of a Bill are
stated, attacked and defended. Although a Bill is rarely defeated
on the Second Reading, the arguments aired will supposedly have some
bearing on the subsequent deliberations during the Committee stage.
The Second Reading Debates in both the Commons and Lords revealed no
*
new justification for UDCs and the Parliamentary majority carried 
the Bill through on principle. Prom this point in each House, the 
principles of the UDC provisions were secure, having been passed 
not necessarily on their own merits but on those of the legislation 
as a whole. Lord Bellwin summing up the Second Reading Debate in 
the Lords:
"If improvements are proposed that do not breach the 
underlying philosophies, we shall welcome them. If 
amendments are put forward to defeat the principles, 
we shall resist them".
(Hansard, 5 August 1980, Col. 1472).
Indeed, amendments affecting fundamental principles of the Bill 
are out of order during the Committee stage.
After the Second Reading in the Commons, the Bill passes to 
one of the Standing Committees, in which membership reflects the 
party proportions in Parliament, for consideration in detail. Each 
clause is put separately to the Committee and proposed amendments 
are accepted, rejected or withdrawn with or without debate. The 
Committee Stage does, however, allow the possibility of substantial
*
The hereditary principle ensures a large and permanent Conservative 
majority in the House of Lords (Birch, 1980, p. 55).
change in legislation. Because of the fewer members involved and 
the detailed nature of the work, party alignments are weakened 
and the Government can be defeated on points with the cumulative 
effect being to alter the nature of parts of a Bill. Although 
proposed amendments are put by M.P.s, they are usually the result 
of lobbying from outside interests. It was through this channel 
that the opposition to TJDCs was directed at the legislative process 
and it is widely acknowledged that the real battles on TJBCs took 
place during the Committee Stages; battles involving strategies, 
tactics and logistics.
In the Commons Committee, the primary concern of opponents 
to UDCs was to amend the Bill to secure a public inquiry before 
designation of a UDC. The Government, however, was strongly opposed 
to writing in any form of consultation or safeguard prior to making 
a Designation Order, arguing that any consultation would cause delay. 
Furthermore, the Government suggested that because any Designation 
Order would be "hybrid" , there would have to be a hearing before 
a Select Committee of the House of Lords. None of the amendments 
proposing consultation procedures were accepted. Other amendments, 
aimed at reducing the specific powers of a UDC and at inserting
Hybridity in a Bill or in a Statutory Instrument such as a 
Designation Order refers to the situation in which the legis­
lation appears to affect the private rights of particular
individuals or corporate bodies. If a Bill is declared hybrid
it is treated like a Private Bill with the opportunity of the 
affected parties to lay petitions against the Bill which are 
then referred to a Select Committee. In the case of a hybrid 
Designation Order, petitions are invited and are considered by 
the Hybrid Instruments Committee of the House of Lords which 
may then refer the Order and petitions to a further inquiry
before a Select Committee of the Lords.
safeguards on its operations, were similarly unsuccessful. The 
Minutes of Proceedings on the Committee Stage (House of Commons 
Paper, No. 619* 1979/80) do not make happy reading for those opposed 
to UDCs; clause after clause remained unaltered, apart from technical 
amendments to the drafting rather than to the substance of the 
legislation.
The Bill continued its passage through the Commons —  the 
Report Stage in which the Bill as amended by Committee is debated 
by Parliament and the formality of the Third Reading —  and was sent 
to the Lords in July. After the Second Reading in the Lords the 
Bill was passed to a Committee of the Whole House. Despite the 
Conservative majority in the Lords, the nature of the membership is 
less closely tied to political parties and the Lords Committee Stage 
does have the potential to make amendments which were prevented in 
the Commons by the Government/Opposition lines. There is an air of 
unpredictability about the fortunes of Bills in the Lords and, as 
the Bill entered the Lords Committee Stage, Planning reported that 
no one knew what would happen.
The focus of attention in the Bill, however, was not on the 
UDC provisions but on the block grant proposals for the funding 
of local government against which all the local authority associa­
tions were ranged. It was then the beginning of October and, with 
the end of the Parliamentary Session in November looming, the 
pressure of time was beginning to tell. The Government had proposed 
numerous technical amendments to the Bill but decided not to press 
many others because of lack of time. The prospect of intensive 
lobbying and obstructionist amendments on both the block grant and
UDC issues posed a real threat to the entire Dill and the Government 
had, somehow, to limit the demands being made for consideration* 
Discussion of UDCs was apparently sacrificed for debate on the block 
grant proposals, in both the Lords and Commons Committee Stages, in 
a deal between the Government and Opposition whereby, if time was 
made available to debate the block grant proposals, then the UDC 
sections would be let through with the minimum of bother.
Nevertheless, the Lords Committee Stage proved the only stage 
in which any change was made to the UDC provisions. Two amendments 
were made; first, a clause was inserted which required a UDC, on 
establishment, to write a Code of Consultation with the local 
authorities. Unlike during the Commons Committee, the Boroughs had 
not pressed for greater consultation before establishment of a UDC. 
Considering the response to these proposals in the Commons, the 
Boroughs considered that any concession they could realistically 
expect would be inadequate but could be enough for the Hybrid 
Instruments Committee, when it came to examine the Designation 
Orders, to decide that there was no need for a further hearing 
(London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1980c). The minor concession 
granted on consultation was unlikely to preclude hearings on the 
Orders.
The second amendment secured was a limitation on the areas in 
England and Vales in which the Secretary of State could establish 
a UDC to Metropolitan Districts and Inner London Boroughs.
*
Personal interview with P. Beasley, Leader of Tower Hamlets
Borough Council, 6 February 1981.
Throughout the debates on the Bill, concern had been expressed at 
the broad powers the enabling legislation would give the Secretary 
of State to set up a UDC anywhere in Britain. Michael Heseltine 
had affirmed that his intentions were limited to London Docklands 
and the Merseyside Dock Area, but many wondered why, if this was 
the case, had he not proposed separate Bills such as an Urban 
Development Corporation (London Docklands) Bill. Suggestions were 
made that a UDC could be used to impose a solution to the Third 
London Airport controversy, that uncooperative local authorities 
could be brought into line by a UDC, and so forth. The Conservative- 
controlled Association of County Councils was especially concerned, 
and it appears that this amendment was a concession to the shire 
counties who had substantial support in the Lords, as well as on 
the Conservative back benches in the Commons, and could well have 
obstructed passage of the Bill. Neither of the two amendments 
significantly changed the nature of the UDC proposals.
This second amendment and the inclusion of UDC legislation in 
a wider Bill, however, nearly back-fired on the Government when it 
led to an unanticipated problem which for a time threatened the 
entire Bill. In the Lords debate following the Committee Stage 
it was suggested that, because of the limited areas to which the 
UDC provisions now applied, the entire Bill was hybrid. If the 
Bill had then been declared hybrid, the more complicated procedures 
required would almost certainly have prevented completion of the 
legislative process before the end of the Parliamentary Session.
The Bill, however, survived the debate; the Lords determining that 
only the UDC Designation Orders need be declared hybrid. All
amendments passed in the Lords were approved on reference hack to 
the Commons and the Royal Assent was given to the Local Government, 
Planning and Land Act 1980 on 13 November, just a fortnight before 
the end of the Session. It remained to be seen whether the procedures 
surrounding the Designation Orders could and would redress the 
failure to give UDCs any kind of adequate hearing.
Hybrid Designation Orders
The Designation Orders setting out the areas and constitutions 
of the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) and the 
Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) were laid before Parliament 
on 27 November 1980 and declared hybrid by the Chairman of Committees 
of the House of Lords on 2 December. Accordingly, there was then a 
statutory period of fourteen days in which petitions against the 
Orders could be lodged.
A petition has a formal structure stating the interests of the 
petitioner, the part(s) of the Order with which the petitioner is 
concerned, the grounds for objection and a request that the Lords 
will not affirm the Order. The contents of an effective petition are 
further defined by the criteria with which the Hybrid Instruments 
Committee decides whether to refer the Order and petitions to a 
Select Committee hearing. To do so, the Hybrid Instruments 
Committee needs to determine that:-
1. the petitioners have a "locus standi"; that is, a 
right to make representations;
2. the petitioners have substantial grounds for complaint;
3. the matters complained of have not been so dealt with 
that no further inquiry is necessary; and
4. the petitioners have not failed to avail themselves 
of other opportunities to deal with the matters 
complained of.
Although the petitioner needs tfsubstantial grounds for complaint”, 
in the case of TJDCs, the petitions were to he lodged against the 
Orders and not against the enabling legislation. Petitioners could 
not, therefore, object to TJDCs in principle but needed to show 
reasons why the particular TJDC should not be set up in the area 
and how the powers and privileges of the TJDC would be prejudicial 
to the interests of the petitioner.
The opponents of the TJDC proposals had been aware of the 
probable opportunity to petition for some months and the focus of 
the campaign was shifted to setting out their arguments in the 
petition form. The opportunity to, and method of, petitioning 
Parliament were publicised throughout London Docklands, notably 
by JDAG which also assisted in the preparation of several petitions.
By 16 December, fourteen petitions had been lodged against the LDDC 
Order and one against the Merseyside Order by a variety of opponents 
representing widespread interests (Listed in Appendix B). The LDDC 
Order was petitioned by community groups, trades councils, tenants 
associations, a chamber of commerce, the Newham, Southwark and 
Tower Hamlets Borough Councils (the areas of Greenwich and Lewisham 
having been excluded from the proposed Urban Development Area), the 
GLC and, interestingly, by five companies involved in development 
projects in the area. The single petition against the MDC Order was 
lodged by the National and Local Government Officers Association 
(NALGO) who also petitioned against the LDDC Order.
The Hybrid Instruments Committee completed its consideration 
of the Orders and petitions on 20 January 1981, after the Christ­
mas Recess. With regard to the LDDC Orders
"The Committee are of the opinion that the petitions ••
• • disclose substantial grounds of complaint and that there 
has been no opportunity of having the matters complained 
of properly inquired into.
The Committee are, therefore, of the opinion that 
there ought to be a further enquiry by a Select Committee.
The substantial grounds of complaint disclosed in these 
petitions challenge the suitability of the area specified 
in the Order for designation as an urban development area".
("First Report from the Hybrid Instruments Committee, House 
of Lords, 20 January 1981).
The Committee, on the other hand, decided that there should be no 
further inquiry into the MDC Order; the one petition against that 
Order having been withdrawn since the Committee began its considera­
tion. The substance of the NALGO petition concerned the possibility 
of redundancies among it members due to- the change in administration 
However, after Government assurances that this would not be the case 
NALGO withdrew its petitions against both the Merseyside and London 
Docklands Orders; thus enabling the MDC Order to proceed unhindered 
toward the affirmative resolution by both Houses on 1 April.
The procedures for petitioning and determining whether or 
not to hold a further inquiry appear quite reasonable until one 
considers the case of the Rimrose Road council housing estate in 
the northern section of the Merseyside Urban Development Area which 
had been included "for the provision of port-related industry"
(King, 1980, p. 3). The prospect of demolition and rehousing by 
Sefton District Council which had long hung over this isolated and
neglected estate had been successfully resisted for years by the 
organisation of many of the seven hundred residents on the grounds 
that the housing was sound, the problem was a lack of services and 
essential maintenance, and, if demolition was to be undertaken, then 
the residents should be rehoused as a community.
The residents only discovered that the estate lay within the 
bounds of the proposed UDC when some tenants1 inquiries to the 
Council about purchasing their houses were rebuffed. Repeated 
requests for an explanation of this refusal finally revealed that 
the reason was the consideration of the proposal for a TJDC. The 
Residents Association of the Rimrose Road Estate were later passed 
confidential (unsigned) correspondence from the Shadow MDC to 
Sefton Council intimating the intention of the former to demolish 
the estate. However, when the Secretary of the Residents Association 
was interviewed on 10 February 1981 > he was unaware that the residents 
could have petitioned against the MDC Designation Order. Had they 
been informed, the petition they would have lodged would possibly 
have taken the Order to a Select Committee hearing, as in the 
London Docklands case.
The hearings into the LDDC Order and petitions began on 
*
10 February • The hearings allow for the Select Committee, which
Due to the timing of this research, details of the petitions and 
the course of the hearings have not been studied closely. Some 
petitions, however, were sighted before the inquiry and they 
indicated highly detailed arguments repudiating the asserted 
benefits of a TJDC and setting out how a UDC would be detrimental 
with respect to particular projects, services, plans, groups of 
people and areas.
is constituted on non-party lines, to cross-examine both the 
petitioners and the proponent of the Order:
"At the Enquiry it will be for the Government to 
explain, through lawyers, how taking powers away 
from Borough Councils to a non-elected body 
appointed by the Secretary of State, Michael 
Heseltine, will speed up redevelopment..."
(Press Release from Nigel Spearing, M.P., 8 January 1981)*
The Secretary of State had an air of confidence before the 
hearings:
"He does not desire to represent that any of the 
Petitioners should be denied a locus standi on their 
Petitions and would be content to deal with any 
grounds of complaint alleged in the Petitions ... ".
("Representations of the Secreatary of State to the 
Hybrid Instruments Committee", 23 December 1980, p. 6).
but this confidence must have subsided somewhat when, at the 
beginning of April, the hearings were entering their seventh week 
after having been originally,scheduled for only two weeks.
The Defence of Urban Development Corporations
The handling by the Government of the controversy over UDCs 
since their proposal in September 1979 revealed no further attempt 
to justify the initiative but a series of efforts to prevent the 
issue being discussed. Throughout, the opponents were not met 
with reason but were confronted with obstructions to argument.
The "Consultation Paper" had been less a vehicle for 
discussion than a statement of intent; the Secretary of State 
stated his unwillingness to discuss the matter. Moreover, the
exact nature of the intent was fair from clear and only took shape 
as the shadow UDCs were set up. It was not until after the enabling 
legislation had been passed that the precise boundaries of the 
Urban Development Areas were given. The boundaries given for the 
Merseyside UDC in the Consultation Paper had been "very provisional" 
and, in London, for a period of six months, the Boroughs of Greenwich 
and Lewisham were unsure whether they would be affected by the 
proposal or not. The uncertainty and speed of development of the 
proposal served to inhibit effective organised opposition. Never­
theless, the opponents in London Docklands managed to mount 
substantial campaigns and redirect the focus as the changing 
circumstances of the proposal demanded —  but to little avail. On 
Merseyside, a Docklands Action Group has only been formed after the 
official establishment of the UDC.
The enabling legislation for UDCs was enacted on only the 
barest consideration of their principles,powers and specifications. 
Included in a major Bill with several other controversial issues, 
debate and examination of the UDC provisions was severely con­
strained by the demands for attention made by the other issues 
within the expedients of parliamentary time. The two changes made 
to the UDC proposals during the legislative process amounted to a 
minor concession and a largely irrelevant limitation on the extent 
to which the proposals could apply rather than to careful considers 
tion of the areas in question and the possible alternative organisa­
tion arrangements, The Government showed no concern for, and made 
no attempt to redress, these- -limitations.
Instead of attempting to justify the TJDC initiative, the 
Government has devoted its efforts to defending the proposals by 
refusing to enter into argument. The hearings on the LDDC 
Designation Order appear to be the first crack in the armour. When 
the TJDC proposal is given a real opportunity to be challenged locally 
and in detail, the future of the TJDC initiative suddenly appears 
shaky. It would be difficult, however, to expect that the report 
of the Select Committee will not be prejudiced by the establishment 
of the shadow TJDC.
The course of events since the proposal of TJDCs provide no 
new grounds for contending that TJDCs, as instruments for "re­
generating their areas" are anything other than an example of 
misinformed public policy. What the events do reveal, however, 
is that, despite the exposes of many opponents, the Government 
has defended this "misinformed policy" with great commitment.
CHAPTER 3
THE LOGIC OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS
The National Interest
The key to understanding the logic of UDCs appears to lie in 
the first clause of the enabling legislation which specifies that 
a UDC may be set up "... if the Secretary of State is of the 
opinion that it is expedient in the national interest to do so,
... " (Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, XVI, 134* 
Author's emphasis). Attempts were made during the Committee Stage 
in the House of Commons to amend this clause by the insertion of 
"after consultation with the appropriate local authorities" and by 
adding "local and regional" to the national interest, but in each 
case the amendment was resisted and the noes had it.
Looking at UDCs in terms of the "local interest" failed to 
offer an explanation for their establishment beyond dismissing 
them as an ill-thought out initiative. When seen in terms of the 
"national interest", on the other hand, much about UDCs which had 
appeared irrational now seems logical. If the logic of UDCs lies 
at the level of national considerations then it is not surprising 
that they appear divorced from the local objective with which they 
have been presented. Furthermore, the Government could then not 
afford to allow the evaluation of UDCs with reference to local 
interests; hence, the defence of UDCs. However, to support this 
suggestion that UDCs are designed in the national rather than local 
interest, it is necessary to clarify two points. First, the
relationship between the priorities of TJDCs and those of the 
central state. Second, the relative independence of these 
priorities from different governments.
The close parallels between the conflicting requirements of 
the central state (Chapter 1.3) and those of urban regeneration 
(Chapter 2.5) are striking. The two basic functions of the central 
state can be crudely reduced to the support of economic production 
and the provision of social services; the essentials of the "welfare 
state". There is much being said about the end of a consensus about 
the welfare state, but to suggest there has ever been a consensus 
about the welfare state is to ignore the fundamental conflict upon 
which it is based. During years of economic growth or stability, 
the two demands on the state may manage to co-exist to some degree 
in an apparent consensus. In economic recession, however, demands 
on the state from both sides are increased and the tension requires 
a readjustment of state intervention. Ultimately, this shift must 
favour production but one obstacle to such a shift is local govern­
ment with its different priorities (Dearlove, 1979)• Michael 
Heseltine has argued the same in defending his desire for greater 
control over local government spending. His reasoning was that, 
although local government is valuable, central government must be 
able to govern the nation according to its policies so local 
authorities, if they prove uncooperative, need to be brought into 
line (speaking on "Weekend World", ITV, 22 March 1981). A TJDC 
replaces "obstructive" local authorities with a system of local 
government which is directly accountable to central government.
The priorities of UDCs, economic development rather than social
services, coincide with those of the central state during economic 
recession.
In striking this particular balance between the requirements 
of urban regeneration, TJDCs are not, however, as radical as they 
first appeared to be. Similar shifts in emphasis had been occurring 
in the other approaches to urban regeneration. Hambleton (1981) 
identified a growing tendency in the first and second round Inner 
Area Programmes for economic development to take precedence over 
other objectives. This tendency has been identified in the 
Liverpool Partnership by the Conference of Socialist Planners (1980) 
and JDAG (House of Commons Paper No. 99(iv), 1978-79) saw a danger 
of it occurring in London Docklands, particularly with regard to 
office development proposals. In GEAR, the emphasis of the SDA 
has moved toward industrial efficiency and away from employment 
maintenance (Gee, 1981). TJDCs can, therefore, be seen as a means 
to facilitate the play of forces in the national economy; forces 
which were, however, not totally frustrated by local government.
Inner city policy has shifted over time from an emphasis on 
people and social services, briefly through one on people and 
employment to one on land and economic development. In arguing 
that theseshifts are largely the result of forces generated by 
the central state during economic recession, rather than of a 
concern for solving the problems of inner areas, it is interesting 
to examine the reasons given by Peter Shore and Michael Heseltine 
for their Governments' intervention in inner cities. According 
to Peter Shore, without government involvement:
"... we shall see the acceleration of decline; the 
emergence of poverty traps and ethnic ghettos, 
physical and moral decay; alienation and violence; 
and the growth and multiplication of problems that 
will plague not only us but generations to come.
That is what is at stake; that is why there 
is a major national interest in success;1
(Shore, 1980, p. 25).
and to Michael Heseltine:
"The inner cities are vitally important to the health 
of the country. We cannot have the thriving society 
we are trying to achieve if we have the inner cities 
decaying at the heart of it. We cannot risk the waste 
of resources, of people and of land, represented by 
areas of dereliction and desolation around our city 
centres. We cannot risk the build up of frustration 
and anger to which such decay gives rise".
(Heseltine, 1979b, P* 1)*
Both write in terms of a concern for the national interest, not 
for the people themselves in the inner areas.
The Prospects for Regeneration by Urban Development Corporation
The "single-minded" approach of UDCs is an attempt to avoid 
the conflict between national and local interests in urban regenera­
tion. In doing so, the organisation structure of UDCs fails to 
recognise the existence of any conflict of interest in the way in 
which regeneration is undertaken. When asked about the future of 
funding for JDAG in the proposed LDDC operation, the Assistant to 
the shadow Chief Executive replied to the effect that: if you want
to run a "slick operation" it does not help to have someone "making
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a nuisance”. Any conflict, however, cannot be assumed away and 
will remain a real element of the situation in which the UDC must 
work.
By failing to provide for resolution of any conflict within 
the organisation, the conflict will probably're-emerge elsewhere. 
There are signs that this will happen. One of the points from a 
meeting convened by JDAG in November 1979 to consider joint action 
with other organisations against the UDC was:
"Even if Heseltine cannot be stopped, there is a need 
for a united body to resist the action of the UDC".
("Notes of Meeting", JDAG, 13 November 1979)•
The platform for the campaign against UDCs announced at the joint 
Labour Party/TUC Conference on UDCs in May 1980 included:
"Labour Councils and trades unions in Docklands 
should use all means possible to defend the 
interests of local people in Docklands, including 
proposals that conflict with the aim of the 
Docklands Strategic Plan, which is to redress the 
deficiencies in the Docklands area and enhance 
the conditions of life in East and South East 
London"•
(Greater London Regional Labour Party, Press Release, 
8 May 1980).
It appears, however, that the tension between UDCs and local 
authorities may be eased as the UDCs are required to be realistic 
about their operating environment. Since September 1979* the
Interview with S. Innes, Assistant to Chief Executive (Designate) 
of LDDC (Designate). 2 February 1980.
Government's statements on UDCs have contained more reference to 
the need to work with rather than against local authorities. The 
consultants report on the Merseyside UDC (Roger Tym and Partners 
Consortium, 1980) set out operating principles for the UDC based 
on an approaisal of how the advantages of a UDC could best be used 
to complement the work of other authorities and saw three main roles 
for the UDC: site development, commercial development and community
development. How widely this view of a sensitive relationship with 
local authorities is held within the MDC is, however, unknown.
The MDC's Director of Development sees the UDC's role in different 
terms:
"In twenty years they could have done the original 
areas and be working their way steadily through 
the city".
(Transcript of interview between J. H. Ritchie, MDC, and 
M. Parkinson, University of Liverpool, 15 January 1981).
This study casts doubt on the value of the development which 
a UDC might achieve, but it will be difficult to evaluate what is 
the result of the UDC and what would have happened otherwise, 
particularly in London Docklands where much work had been done on 
site development. One thing is certain, though, and that is that 
the initiation of UDCs has initially held back development in 
London Docklands. One of the main aims of UDCs is to inspire 
confidence in their areas but since September 1979 the future of 
Docklands has been one of uncertainty. The Isle of Dogs Local Plan 
(Local Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1981), published in January 19819 
begins with a statement on the uncertain status of the Plan; it may
or may not become the statutory plan depending on the outcome of
the UDC issue. The greatest illustration of the detrimental effect
of the UDC proposal on the regeneration of London Docklands is the 
*
fact that the DJC ceased operations on 5 April 1981 while the LDDC 
Designation Order was still subject to the House of Lords hearings.
Urban Regeneration in an Uncertain Environment
Even within their limited potential contribution to urban 
regeneration, the success of UDCs is uncertain. The UDC strategy 
is a gamble on the future propensity of the private sector to 
invest, a gamble on an upturn in the economy. Those few economic 
predictions which do forecast an end to the recession do so only 
very cautiously and there is no guarantee that any revival would 
not be short lived. In this uncertain economic climate, there is 
an uncertainty on the part of government about how to tackle urban 
regeneration; witness the three different approaches practised in 
Liverpool, London Docklands and Glasgow and, besides UDCs, the 
present Government has also established Enterprise Zones including 
one on Merseyside and one proposed for the Isle of Dogs, in which 
an attempt is made to encourage investment by removing government 
constraints.
Davies (1980) has identified two broad schools of thought on 
the issue. First, those who say economic development is the only 
goal to aim for, arguing either that there must be economic growth
*
The DJC existed subject to the Secretary of State’s approval 
and under central government legislation.
before there can be redistribution or that it is the only realistic 
alternative. Second, those who say that the economic policies must 
be tied directly to the needs and interests of those who suffer 
from the problems. It is argued that this can be achieved either 
by the careful design of policy to make sure that the unemployed 
and otherwise disadvantaged are effectively assisted or by creating 
a new sector of the economy such as one based on "community enter- 
rpise". The resolution of this choice depends on how one is 
prepared to distribute the costs of industrial and economic change. 
The economic uncertainties associated with the first school of 
thought, however, and the evidence of unemployment and deprivation 
suggest that attention should be focused on the second area of 
possible policy, particularly on attempts to link economic 
regeneration with employment and social objectives.
To make such recommendations for policy alternatives to the 
TJDC approach appears presumptuous, however, when one considers that 
a great number of people have directed their efforts since September 
1979 in a campaign for such alternatives —  but to no avail. If 
one finds the conditions in areas such as London Docklands and 
Merseyside unacceptable and sees TJDCs as an unacceptable solution, 
then the main conclusion from this study of TJDCs is that one should 
look to ways of reordering the priorities of the central state.
The priorities of the state in Britain are based upon a socio­
economic system in which there is a great gulf between the distri­
bution of wealth and that of welfare. Peter Townsend’s recent 
study of poverty in Britain (Townsend, 1979) concluded with policy 
recommendations directed at narrowing the gulf but he acknowledged 
this would be neither easy nor likely:
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"The citadels of wealth and privilege are deeply- 
entrenched and have shown tenacious capacity to 
withstand assaults ... Yet we have observed the 
elaborate hierarchy of wealth and esteem, of which 
poverty is an integral part. If any conclusion 
deserves to be picked out from this report as its 
central message it is this, with which, some time, 
the British people must come to terms,"
(Townsend, 1979* p. 926).
For better policy, the first step is to recognise that the state 
is not neutral, that it has priorities which favour certain groups 
over others, for these priorities of the central state constitute 
the logic of TJDCs,
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APPENDIX A. MEMBERSHIP OF DOCKLANDS ORGANISATIONS
(a) DOCKLANDS JOINT COMMITTEE ( - as at 16 October 1978)
Chairman: Sir Hugh Wilson, OBE
Vice-Chairman: Cllr. J. H. OfGrady (Leader of Southwark Borough
Council)
*
Constituent Authority Members :
Authority No. of Members
Greater London Council 8
Greenwich Borough Council 1
Lewisham Borough Council 1
Newham Borough Council 2
Southwark Borough Council 2
Tower Hamlets Borough Council 2
Co-opted Members:
D. C. Cross (Merchant Banker)
Sir John Cuckney (Chairman of the Port of London Authority)
K. Halpin (Chairman of the Docklands Forum)
C. A. Prendergast (Chairman of the Location of Offices Bureau)
D. Sainsbury (Retail Finance Director)
Norman Willis (TUC)
Sir Hugh Wilson, OBE (Architect and Town Planner)
*
Includes leaders of each constituent authority.
(b) DOCKLANDS FORUM
- Organisations represented on the Docklands Dorum as at 30 
August 1978.
Trades Union Council
Transport and General Workers Union (Docks)
Transport and General Workers Union (Waterways)
National Union of Teachers
Bethnal Green and Stepney Trades Council
Southwark Trades Council
West Ham Trades Council
Greenwich Trades Council
Bermondsey Trades Council
Lewisham and Deptford Trades Council
Confederation of British Industry
Newham Chamber of Commerce
London Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Joint Docklands Action Group
East End Docklands Action Group
Lewisham Docks Action Group
Isle of Dogs Action Group
Downtown Tenants Association
Bermondsey and Rotherhithe Society
Lewisham Council of Social Service (Voluntary Action Lewisham) 
Canning Town Community Development Project 
Age Concern
Greater London Churches Council 
Newham Churches Docklands Group 
Tower Hamlets Rural Deanery 
Surrey Docks Ecumen ical Group 
London Industrial Chaplaincy 
Goldsmith’s College 
Queen Mary College 
Transport on Water 
North Woolwich Tenants Association 
Association of Island Communities 
Allotments for the Future 
Newham Voluntary Agencies Council
Source: Expenditure Committee (Environment Sub-Committee). Minutes of
Evidence. "Redevelopment of London Docklands", House of Commons 
Paper, No. 99(ii), 1978-79, pp. 38-39.
APPENDIX B. PETITIONS LODGED AGAINST THE DESIGNATION ORDERS 
FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS
London Docklands Development Corporation (Area and Constitution 
Order 1980)
1. Newham Chamber of Commerce.
2. Newham Voluntary Agencies Council.
3. Greater London Council.
4. Mrs. Anne King.
5. Bermondsey Forum;
North Southwark Community Development Group;
Mayflower Tenants1 Association;
Southwark Docklands1 Campaign;
Surrey Docks Child Care Project.
6. Tower Hamlets Trade Council;
Southwark Rades Council;
West Ham Trades Council.
7. Association of Wapping Organisations;
Stephen and Matilda Tenants Cooprative;
South Quay Tenants Association;
Limehouse Development Group.
8. Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets Borough Councils.
9. News International Limited.
10. Association of Island Communities.
11. Proprietors of Hay’s Wharf Limited;
London Brige Properties Limited;
London Bridge Development Limited;
St. Martins Property Investments Limited.
12. The National and Local Government Officers Association.
Merseyside Development Corporation (Area and Constitution 
Order i~980l'----- --------  ---- --------------------
1. Tha National and Local Government Officers Association.
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